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ABSTRACT 
 Wittgenstein once asked, “What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes 
up from the fact that I raise my arm?” What would be left is, presumably, the quality of 
‘agency,’ which differentiates between legitimate actions and mere behaviors. In my 
dissertation I investigate the way we conceive of this quality and recommend a change of 
the prevalent model for one that is developed in a more empirically informed way.  
Most current work in ethics employs a historically acquired and folk-psychology 
approved notion of agency. On this view, the distinction between actions and behaviors is 
fairly clear-cut. Actions proper are characteristic of human beings. They are ‘rational’ in 
either the deliberative process that preceded it or in terms of their efficacy; they are 
launched ‘autonomously’ by the agent’s self rather than influenced by context, emotion 
or habit. These, and a few other conditions have to be fulfilled for an act to earn the 
badge of an action; falling short of that standard disqualifies it, or, at the very least 
renders it an imperfect, faulty instance of agency. An agent is thus typically viewed as a 
disembodied, rational source of conduct, who can withhold her desires and choose 
between different courses of action using some form of deliberation.  
 I submit that this model survives neither due to its empirical adequacy nor 
  v 
because it is otherwise valuable for ethics (or, more generally, for understanding human 
behavior). Rather, there is (I argue), a certain widespread philosophical attitude that 
determines its persistence—a general longing for the stability of the self and an orderly, 
controllable relationship between the agent and the world. I call the proponents of this 
attitude “tortoises” and offer a critique of their main claims. I conclude that we must alter 
this model. The empirical results from psychology and neuroscience suggest that an agent 
is best viewed as a bundle of modules that are governed by different rules. None of them 
is “more” the agent than another, but all operate to achieve a state of homeostasis 
between so the different processes within the agent and the environment.  
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* * * 
 
If James is right, and philosophy is to a great extent a matter of temperament,1 then  some 
divides between us could be more than arguments can handle. The new ruler of Denmark, 
from Zbigniew Herbert’s Elegy of Fortinbras,2 certainly believes so. Looking at Hamlet’s 
dead body, Fortinbras joylessly says, “The rest is not silence but belongs to me,” because 
“I have tasks a sewer project / and a decree on prostitutes and beggars.” As Fortinbras 
goes on with his soliloquy, he keeps flaunting his down-to-earth mentality and pragmatic 
disposition, fascinated by the contrast between himself and the prince—who was, he 
triumphantly declares, “not for life”.  The poem concludes with two haunting lines: 
It is not for us to greet each other or bid farewell we live on archipelagos 
and that water those words what can they do what can they do prince 
There are, undoubtedly, many types of temperaments, but in terms of how they 
manifest themselves in philosophy, that they can be, I suspect, divided into two principal 
kinds. The first kind, let us name it a Tortoise, likes things slow, yet steady. It seeks 
                                                
1 “The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments” 
James, Pragmatism, 19 
2 Herbert, The Collected Poems. Translation: Czesław Miłosz.  
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stability and avoids disintegration, takes solace in the presence of a method and shivers at 
the sight of luck. It prefers rules over habits, and metaphysics over sociology. The 
lightness of being seems to him quite unbearable, hence the hard, heavy shell on his back. 
The fear of fracture and decomposition can be, for a Tortoise, best alleviated by 
strengthening control—be it his control over others, or others’ control over him; be it a 
norm that strongly binds, or indisputable command of God. The self is a unity, repeats a 
Tortoise; morality is coherent, we have control over ourselves and over our destiny; the 
outside world probably exists, and there are at least one or two things we can know for 
sure.  
The other kind of temperament is best imagined as a Hare, freer and faster, but 
without a good a priori plan. A Hare has never fully learned to (using Herbert’s words 
again), “Repeat old incantations of humanity fables and legends /…/ repeat great words 
repeat them stubbornly.”3 Thus when the Tortoise admires a majestic oak tree, or a great 
philosophical notion, she cannot help but wonder what made that particular acorn sprout, 
not some other.4 She is interested in genesis more than the status quo, in the mechanism 
more than the structure, in the process more than the result. Where the Tortoise sees 
stability, she sees temporary homeostasis; where he sees nature, she suspects convention. 
She does not search for design, perfection or unity. She disregards Archimedes’ plea that 
                                                
3 Herbert, The Envoy of Mr. Cogito 
4 This image comes from another one of Zbigniew Herbert’s poem, Dęby; not yet translated. The 
poem tell a story of a man who seeks advice from the oak trees, but hesitates to take it, once he 
remembers their arbitrary beginnings.  
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a firm place to stand should be given before the Earth can be moved; she grabs at it from 
a wobbly standpoint and tries to shake it, at least a little bit. The Tortoise is, for the most 
part, appalled.  
The Tortoise and the Hare keep clashing within pretty much all philosophical 
themes, but the problem of action makes the conflict particularly stark. One the one hand, 
agency is a candidate Archimedean point from which the entire problem of morality can 
be lifted, if we take it to be both the metaphysical cause and the normative measurement 
of the things we do. It is one of the stubbornly repeated great words, a hope for personal 
unity, a centering notion that, if not mistreated, could allow us to continue speaking in the 
language of ‘the old incantations of humanity’. But, on the other hand, its embroilment in 
the physical notion of causality invites its own doom from the hands of the Hare, or, if in 
luck, some half-hearted compatibilistic grace. Neuroscience is almost ready to confirm or 
falsify the old ideas on how action comes about, and slowly forces metaethics to retreat 
from the long-occupied descriptive realm into the tiny normative fort. For it seems that 
increasingly often we are offered new evidence for the lack of control over our conduct, 
for our inability to compute the right choice of action and for the great influence of body, 
habit, emotion and context on our daily exercises in agency. Every Tortoise, I believe, 
already knows that. 
In this dissertation I am mainly interested in the accounts of the processes that result 
in actions. This theme is strongly overlapping with the so-called problem of practical 
reason, but it goes beyond it—for I am not ready to claim that all legitimate actions must 
be rational, or that there exists a specific mental process (such as practical reasoning) that 
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is a sine qua non condition for agency. In order to avoid using words that arrive with 
substantial philosophical baggage, I will simply say that I am interested in the stuff that is 
going on in the head and its surroundings before (or while) an action happens to happen.  
And it happens so, I argue, that most of the mainstream accounts of this ‘stuff’ are 
ridden by Tortoise intuitions. This might be not bad in itself, of course; a matter of 
temperamental preference—but I claim that these inner instincts of a Tortoise 
temperament often manifest themselves by the tacit allegiance to the habits of language 
and thought that can be traced back to obsolete frameworks. In particular, I claim that 
many theories of action are organized as if a certain model of the mind (or a subset 
thereof, involved in issuing action) were true, namely the computational, von 
Neumannesque one.  
I am not saying that any of the Tortoises I analyze would admit to believing in the 
adequacy, let alone truthfulness of this model. Most of them would reject it. No one 
claims nowadays that the mind is best understood as a von Neumann machine, or at least 
we should hope so. What I mean when I say that these theories have (linguistic and 
inferential) habits that operate as if such model was being assumed is a comment on the 
structure of the metaphorical core of their operative framework. I follow Lakoff and 
Johnson5 in their intuition that abstract thought is necessarily metaphorical, and that the 
mechanics of particular semantic groups can be traced to a system of guiding metaphors, 
which generate the rules of what constitute a sensible movement of thought in that area. 
In the conceptual area around the notion of agency, at least for metaethicists, sensible 
                                                
5 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh; Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By. 
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movement of thought is organized by the idea that context is input, beliefs are data, and 
reasoning is symbolic manipulation that generates the answer to the question “what 
should I do?” On the output we are awaiting an intention, a candidate intention, or, in 
some specific theories (like Robert Audi’s, for instance), action itself.  
At the onset of the AI research, symbolic manipulation was considered to be the core 
and only principle behind intelligent behavior—a paradigm now best known by its goofy 
acronym ‘GOFAI’ (Good, Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence). Not many of the 
Tortoises have even concerned themselves with the AI research, of course; I am not 
claiming that this is where they, so to speak, got the idea. This paradigm, however, has 
emerged from a once commonsensical view on the mind, appropriated for AI by some 
Tortoise, who was then on duty. It is, in my view, simply the best candidate notion for the 
‘personification’ of the underlying metaphor; an image coherent in itself, and which 
allows for an effective setup of the discussion between Tortoises and neuroscience, which 
I am trying to ‘arrange’. I am quite aware that the days when rational deliberation in 
philosophy was openly considered to be a one-to-one function from the available data to 
the ‘best judgment’ is a thing of the past; the idea has changed, evolved and became more 
open to incorporate the emotional, habitual and physical factors in action. But the GOFAI 
metaphor is still behind many of those evolved theories, visible in what Scheler would 
call ordo amoris6 of a theory, the structure of the emotional preferences that shimmer 
through the tendencies of argumentation.  
                                                
6 Scheler, 'Ordo Amoris' in: Selected Philosophical Essays. 
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How can this generative template of a secret metaphor be detected? There are no 
foolproof tools for that. Lakoff and Johnson, in search for their metaphors, simply trace 
linguistic tendencies, and, very much like ethnomethodologists, probe and poke the 
semantic taboos, revealing what Richard Rorty called ‘final vocabularies,’7 but in their 
structural incarnation. The questions we should ask, then, could be these: what does this 
theorist consider to be the ‘problem’? For a Tortoise, the problem would often be the 
apparent lack of computational efficacy of the currently used deliberative algorithm (“it 
seems that if we believe that the right thing to do is the sum of present reasons, what do 
we do about this one case, in which two reasons cancel each other out?”)8 Another good 
question: is her response to the problem automatically supplying a missing cog in the 
current model, or is she even considering switching to a different one? The importance of 
emotions, for instance, can be a reason for turning to a pragmatic account of conduct, or 
reinterpreted as value indicators that change the structure of payoffs, and thus influence 
the result of deliberation. Also, when her framework is ‘assaulted’ by the realities of 
cognition or luck, does she speak in a hopeful or a resigned manner? If unpredictability of 
the world is, for her, not something we take head on, but rather something that we must 
shield ourselves against with a sufficiently thick theoretical wall, she might be a Tortoise.  
And if you are a Tortoise, the GOFAI model has a number of added bonuses for you 
in stock. Even if its taken as a regulative ideal, its very possibility indicates the existence 
                                                
7 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. 
8 A similar problem can be found in: Lechler, “Do Particularists Have a Coherent Notion of a 
Reason for Action?”. 
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of rational order. Its in-built logical coherence permits the potential of individual unity 
and political uniformity, and maintains the hope for the kingdom of ends. It carries within 
it a ready-made normative mechanism and presumes the world of neatly ordered, 
‘codable’ options. And, when coupled with a certain view on the architecture of the 
psyche, it provides elegant means to fulfill the need to think about ourselves as unified, 
while still torn by the contradictory and animalistic forces of the heart and flesh. We 
simply have to limit ‘true’ agency to the operations of the device and the one force 
(separate, or identical with it) that carries out its end result, treating the remainder of 
motivating forces as a controllable nuisance. And then, even though divided in half, at 
least we have a good sense of where the ‘true’ self dwells: 
“…When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all your 
desires something that is you, and that chooses which one to act on. The idea that 
you choose among your conflicting desires, rather than just waiting to see which one 
wins, suggests that you have reasons for or against acting on them. And it is these 
reasons, rather than the desires themselves, which are expressive of your will…”9 
The reason I try to show the persistent influence of the von Neumannesque metaphor 
is my belief that its secret subsistence is harmful for the development of moral 
philosophy, perhaps even more so than it would be if it was out in the open. It goes, I 
believe, in the face of pretty much all relevant evidence from psychology, social 
psychology and neuroscience that we have available at the moment, and nothing indicates 
that the future will might bring radically different results. The neuroscientific paradigm 
                                                
9 Korsgaard, C., Creating the Kingdom of Ends, p. 370 
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of understanding behavior is likely to soon replace the currently reigning Freud-tinted 
Tortoise perspective as the basis of ‘commonsense intuitions’ about action. If ethics is not 
ready to offer a perspective that can be logically, metaphysically and metaphorically 
squared with such view, it might either become irrelevant and ineffectual, or a cause for a 
cultural neurosis. And it does not need to be this way. When Amelie Rorty in Social and 
Political Sources of Akrasia wrote about the curiously habitual nature of the weakness of 
the will in modern polity, she could have chosen to simply shame her hypothetical 
akratoi for their failings and mourn their inability to hold on to their principles. This 
strategy would, however, drive an even bigger wedge between the structure and demands 
of moral theory and the lives of the ‘sinners’ she describes. Instead, she chooses to 
acknowledge the widespread moral schizophrenia as a symptom of the flawed 
interactions between citizens and institutions, and ponders changes that could foster more 
desirable, and calmer characters. It is just one small example of how a more adequate 
perspective on the emergence of conduct allows for a sensible diagnosis of the mismatch 
between moral demands and culture; the alternative is a pessimistic view of agency and 
armchair “practical” philosophy.  
I begin the first part of this dissertation by introducing the concept of a Tortoise 
theory of action. I try to show how the fight for more relevant theory should focus on 
ridding moral philosophy of the underlying calculative metaphor. I then try to show that a 
Tortoise might try to avoid the naturalistic input because a GOFAI theory of action might 
be used to generate normativity from what within the paradigm passes as ‘description’. I 
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try to show that this argument cannot be made, and thus sticking to an empirically 
inadequate model cannot be even justified with philosophical advantages.  
The second part is devoted to an exposition of theories that try to model the ‘stuff’ 
that happens in our brain before (or during) and action is performed. I focus mainly on 
Robert Kurzban’s modular view of the mind, Daniel Dennett’s Multiple Drafts model of 
conscious brain and Gilles Fauconnier’s notion of mental spaces as subunits of just-in-
time, non-GOFAI processing.10 I am trying to use these theories to show a modeling 
approach that is empirically adequate, explanatory and, as much as possible, continuous 
from the physiological level to the level of phenomenology.  
There are many things that I am not going to do. The target of my critique is a 
general template that happens to shape many conceptions of pre-action processing, and 
not particular realizations of that template. My argument, therefore, is independent from 
the debate on what exactly constitutes the data that are being processed (internal or 
external reasons, calculations of pleasure, moral payoffs from fulfilling different kinds of 
duties, values of means with respect to ends, etc.) as well as from the particular form of 
algorithmic manipulation postulated by a theory (be it Kantian universalizability of an 
adequate maxim, a practical syllogism, the application of moral axioms to problems at 
hand or a method for weighing reasons). I will therefore stay clear of these debates, with 
the occasional exception for the discussion of autonomy and its role in agency (my 
                                                
10 In the exposition of Fauconnier’s conception, I strongly rely on the extended version of the 
notion of mental space as introduced by Hurley, Dennett, and Adams  (Hurley, Dennett, and 
Adams, Inside Jokes.) 
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interest in the issues of autonomy is prompted by a curious relationship this concept often 
has with the GOFAI model. The von Neumanesque machine is conceptualized as a 
processing device, but (for some thinkers) unless the output tape is picked by someone (a 
little homunculus sitting right next to the output slot), and implemented by that someone 
(it cannot simply happen automatically, as the next computational step; an intention has 
to be formed or the will has to step up, or the self must be clear-headed enough to read 
off the output tape correctly), there is no agency, only a Chinese room that “speaks” the 
language of action (with dictionaries replaced by Bayesian tables, of course). The 
allegiance to the computational metaphor and the need of the control of the procedure 
often result, I think, in pretty outlandish models of the psyche.  
I said I want to argue in favor of a descriptively accurate model of human agency 
that is built for the purposes of moral philosophy, but still in reasonable agreement with 
the findings of neuroscience and psychology; a model that avoids the traps of the old 
language of misguided beliefs about rationality. But this model will not be to a Tortoise’s 
liking: it will view action as a result of a number of different forces, represented by 
modules that evolved for different purposes. It will see practical deliberation as mostly 
unconscious, happening across disjointed probes of sparse and unorganized 
consciousness. It will understand an agent as a Pandemonium of sorts, where different 
kinds of forces continuously fight for influence, and their winning or losing cannot be 
well predicted by an algorithm. It will see processing as associative, embodied, habit-
driven and parallel, rather than symbolic and linear. And, most of all, it will not need to 
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use language that postulates some form of homuncular perspective, for as the unifying 
force it will enlist a form of homeostasis, not coherence, control or the will.    
Perhaps, then, if temperaments are the force that divides us the strongest, there is no 
point in putting Part I and Part II in the same work—for even if a Tortoise accepts the 
critique and starts to worry about his view, he would not be exactly thrilled by an 
alternative that violates his deepest moral and aesthetic affinities and his beliefs about the 
very purpose of metaethics. A Hare might seem faster at first, more suited for the race 
that the Tortoise, but then, as in the Aesop’s tale, she ends up losing anyway, convincing 
only those that believed her in the first place; the running was useless. We do perhaps, 
after all, live on archipelagos.  
I do, in fact, agree with Fortinbras. There is not much that the water, or the words 
can do, when ordines amoris are radically divergent, and each of us seeks a different kind 
of solace in philosophical work. And yet, I reckon, the only proper answer to this is, ‘Oh, 
well”. We should still try to explain ourselves to the other, for there is no other way of 
making sense of ourselves as philosophers than the constant rebuilding of a theoretical 
‘reflective equilibrium’ under the gaze of the opponent. Who knows, perhaps Hamlet’s 
problem with agency, his inability to act and the lack of self-understanding might have 
been alleviated if he had have a chance to speak to Fortinbras, the way Fortinbas speaks 
to him. We also grow as philosophers by trying to make private intuitions intelligible for 
differently-minded people (and such is the purpose of writing a thesis). And sometimes, 
every once in a while, a message in a bottle is found, picked and read. Who knows, 
maybe somewhere there someone is already building a boat.  
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At times, however, we are in luck, and we find someone else, who can explain 
exactly what we have in mind with a skill that, for us, is not quite available. This 
probably gives our message far more chances of taking some sort of effect. And for that 
reason I would like to end this introduction with a quote from John Dewey, who happens 
to expresses the exact concern that has driven me to write a thesis that explores the 
possibility of empirically adequate modeling of action: 
“It is not pretended that a moral theory based upon realities of human nature and a 
study of those realities with those of physical science would do away with moral 
struggle and defeat […] All action is an invasion of the future, of the unknown. 
Conflict and uncertainty are the ultimate traits. But morals based upon concern with 
facts and deriving guidance from knowledge of them would at least locate the points 
of effective endeavor and would focus available resources upon them. It would put 
an end to the impossible attempt to live in two unrelated worlds. It would destroy 
fixed distinction between the human and the physical, as well as that between the 
moral and the industrial and political. A morals based on the study of human nature 
instead of upon disregard for it would find the facts of man continuous with those of 
other human beings, and therefore would link ethics with the study of history, 
sociology, law and economics.11  
 
                                                
11 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, xxvi 
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Part I  
Tortoise in a Warehouse:  
Ethics and its Secret Model of the Mind 
  
15 
1.  Murdoch’s  ca l l  
Imagine that you are in a shop; a large warehouse, if you will. You have two books with 
you — one containing your desires, the other one listing your beliefs. You are free, you 
are clearheaded, you are independent; you are ready to shop. So you pull out your books, 
consult them carefully (it certainly is great, you think, that your personalized list of 
beliefs now comes with detailed warehouse inventory included), and engage in the 
process of calculating all the pros and cons. After a brief period of scratching your head, 
you come to the inevitable conclusion: given what you know and what you want, you 
should purchase the reasonably priced juicer from aisle 11. You pull yourself away from 
the sweets stand, where you were just about to satisfy your cravings, and you head to 
aisle 11. 
A similar image was used by Iris Murdoch as a kind of reductio ad absurdum meant 
to illustrate what has gone awry in the way moral philosophy spoke about action. 12 The 
frameworks used by thinkers like Stuart Hampshire reduced, Murdoch complained, the 
psychologically complex process of moral decision-making to an exercise in 
disembodied, rigidly rule-governed and methodologically uniform exercise in calculation, 
performed in a world furnished with clearly distinguishable options. In theories of this 
                                                
12 This metaphor was originally used by Iris Murdoch in Murdoch, Iris The idea of Perfection, in: 
“Existentialists and Mystics”, p. 305. I took the liberty to borrow the idea and extend it. When 
Murdoch brings up the ‘shopping’ image, she does it to model Stuart Hampshire’s view of moral 
agency, which she finds to be the problem of philosophical thinking about morality. 
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sort an agent is presented as a computing device calculating the value of the extensionally 
presented options: what ought John do if action x is a fulfillment of a promise, but action 
y is helping the wounded crash victim, called for by the duty of help? Tell me, John 
should say, how much is my duty worth against my obligation, and I will calculate the 
answer for you. But moral agents, claimed Murdoch, do not act in this manner; they are, 
rather, attempting to remain virtuous against a variety of incoherent drives and cognitive 
shortcomings, struggling in a mysterious world that, just to complicate things further, 
bears the imprint of their gaze, a gaze that is laden with habit and emotion. John does not 
just have two options, but countless options; he could do x, but also x1 or x2, and more 
often than not he does not even see some of them as discrete options, blinded by the 
emotional and cognitive stress of witnessing a car crash. Murdoch thus called for a 
different strategy in constructing a model for moral decision-making: “A working 
philosophical psychology is needed which can at least attempt to connect the modern 
psychological terminology with the terminology concerned with virtue. We need a moral 
philosophy which can speak significantly of Freud and Marx … (In current philosophy) 
the will, and the psyche as the object of science, are isolated from each other and from 
the rest of philosophy.”13  
What Murdoch was trying to say is, I believe, that there is no point in doing 
metaethics if we start off with an inaccurate understanding of the mechanics of the 
workings of an agent’s mind.14 The shopping scenario suggests that the processing mind 
                                                
13 Murdoch, Iris: Existentialists and Mystics, p. 337 
14 I am not saying that Murdoch, or myself, would claim that a thorough understanding of the 
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is a (distant, but still) cousin of a von Neumann machine, a device designed according to 
the principles of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI15) with data and 
instructions neatly stored, frozen in the expectation of the input question. The difference 
is that a computing device works as a sum of non-hierarchically organized cooperating 
parts, while in the mind of an agent there is a supervising element (the self? the will?) 
that actually pulls all the ‘computation strings’ and executes the computed outputs. 
Unless Freud and Marks mess up this all too neat model a little bit, Murdoch believes, its 
inadequacy will breed more philosophy that will neither be able to guide, nor to explain.  
Murdoch identified an important problem with the direction ethics was heading in 
                                                                                                                                            
phenomenon of human mind, on all the levels, is a necessary prerequisite for a responsible theory 
of action. What we need to have, however, is a fairly good and a fairly accurate model of how we 
generate action, and that will include, and depend on, some parts of our theory on how the mind 
works.  
15 GOFAI, an acronym for ‘Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence’ is a term first introduced 
by John Haugeland (in Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence.) It refers to the idea, prominent at the 
onset of AI research, that intelligence consists in logical manipulation of symbols. GOFAI 
proponents would believe that more complex behaviors can be reproduced by the increase in 
speed and complexity of computing, and by the increase in volume of data, rather than by 
changes to the architecture of the system. Opponents of this approach would include, for instance, 
connectionist models of intelligence. A connectionist model allows for non-linear, parallel 
processing, where more complex behaviors are assumed to emerge from on-the-go feedback-
based learning experience which changes the strength of successful connections between 
‘neurons’.  
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her time. Whether we are aware of it or not, all talk about moral agency carries 
assumptions about how the mind works—and these particular assumptions seemed 
distorting and obsolete. But today things seem different—and Murdoch, I believe, could 
feel justifiably vindicated.  
Since her call, the ‘shopping scenario’ has earned itself a considerable opposition, 
which has successfully entered the mainstream debate in ethics. Philosophers have been 
pointing out the holes in the ‘GOFAI plus driver’ model, claiming that it is far too 
simplistic, even when taken as a purposeful idealization. Many of them were of virtue-
ethical provenience.16  They emphasized, for instance, the fact that a shopping model of 
agential deliberation requires that action choices be uniformly ‘codable’, identifiable in a 
discrete manner, as if they were ready-made, uniformly shaped products on shelves (but, 
“We do not just open doors, leave rooms”—wrote Amelie Rorty—“we leave them 
ceremoniously, contemptuously, or expectantly. We do not just tend our elderly parents: 
                                                
16 I am referring here to the turn towards virtue ethics associated, for instance, with Philippa 
Foot’s work Foot, Virtues & Vices, & Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. or Alasdair MacIntyre 
MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals; MacIntyre, After Virtue.; it is present in Susan Wolf’s 
work Wolf, “Morality and the View from Here”; Wolf, “Moral Saints.” as well as Amelie Rorty’s 
Rorty, “Three Myths of Moral Theory”; Rorty, “The Social and Political Sources of Akrasia”; 
Rorty, “Explaining Emotions”; Rorty, “Moral Complexity, Conflicted Resonance and Virtue”; 
Rorty, Mind in Action.; it also figures prominently in Martha Nussbaum’s writings Nussbaum, 
Upheavals of Thought; Nussbaum, Poetic Justice; Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social 
Justice,” May 1, 1992. 
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we do so tenderly or exasperatedly, respectfully or resentfully”17) They rebelled against 
the general tendency to represent a good agent as Bayesian rational, lucid, methodical, 
calculating; and her choices as trivially repeatable due to their calculatively understood 
rationality (“This idea”—wrote famously Susan Wolf about the allegedly attainable 
“special state” of pure rationality and impartiality in which, or from which, we are 
supposedly making moral decisions —“both arises from and perpetuates a false picture of 
human psychology and value, and it encourages an unduly narrow and ultimately 
implausible conception of what a correct and rational morality might be”18).  
Some of the thinkers were put off by the shopping scenario’s lack of fit with what 
we know about the mechanics of human action both from empirical studies and 
introspection. They demanded that actual human conduct be studied before it is modeled 
by metaethics. This demand became present even among the scholars associated with the 
Kantian tradition (David Velleman, for instance, says in defense of his view of practical 
reason as a methodologically imprecise exercise in narration accompanying the life of an 
agent: “If this thinking isn’t what philosophers call practical reasoning, the problem may 
be that practical reasoning, as conceived by philosophers, is not something that 
autonomous agents generally do”19). The same concern prompted a return to the Humean 
vision of the acting agent, which is traditionally empirically informed and based on 
holistically imagined models of the mind. Jesse Prinz, for instance, convincingly argued 
                                                
17 Rorty, Mind in Action., p. 284 
18 Wolf, “Morality and the View from Here,” 204. 
19 Velleman, How We Get Along. 
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that empirical studies indicate that emotions (understood in the Jamesian fashion as ‘gut 
reactions’), not calculative reason, are at the core of moral agents;20 Patricia Churchland 
set out to trace the origins of moral decision-making to neurobiology and concluded that 
what seems to be rationally undertaken exercise in moral agency is often a result of our 
neurobiological make-up.21 Since Murdoch wrote her rant against Hampshire, the world 
around the philosophical agent got more complicated, her self less centered, 
consciousness more ‘gappy and sparse’22, processing more random and buggy, the mind 
less susceptible to modeling in a ‘GOFAI’ fashion, and reason far less mighty and far 
more connected to the agent’s flesh and heart. The shoppers, like sluggish Tortoises, 
stayed far behind the progress of philosophy, together with those using final causes in 
scientific explanation or the Cartesian Theatre enthusiasts.  
Even those who remained somewhat attached to the image of a free and rational, 
deliberating shopper at heart, still have refined it and refurbished it, making it more 
palatable for those concerned with ‘Freud and Marx’23 (though nowadays Murdoch 
would more likely invoke figures like V. S. Ramachandran, Oliver Sachs or Benjamin 
                                                
20 Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals. 
21 Churchland, Braintrust. 
22 Dennett’s phrase from Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1992. 
23 The refinement of the view of moral agency as connected with calculation of reasons relied 
mainly on de-universalizing moral problems and moving towards particularism, while retaining 
the deliberative character of moral reflection Dancy, Moral Reasons; Dancy, “Defending 
Particularism”; Dworkin, “Unprincipled Ethics.” 
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Libet in order to make her point). Ever since Herbert Simon’s analysis of the role of 
context in practical reasoning,24 microeconomics, the traditional bastion of the Bayesian 
model, started to admit that not only do agents not deliberate in a manner suggested by 
the shopping model,25 but even if they did, they would often be less effective.26 The 
shortcomings of the paradigm, it seems, became too glaringly obvious (both in its 
normative and descriptive aspects) to openly continue doing metaethics in a Wal-Mart 
setting.  
Are we done with the shopping then; can we, philosophers of action, as those that 
prepare the ground for moral reflection, move toward a more accurate view of moral 
agency? Can we leave the Tortoise behind and leap forward, towards an adequate 
explanation of the somewhat messy human action-generation mechanism, which would 
drop the useless Bayesian idealizations and the habit of seeing GOFAI-like structures as 
the best idealizations? Are we ready to think about conduct as something that is not a 
result of conscious calculations, but that organically emerges from the phylogenetic 
constraints of our biology, the context of our moves and our application of culturally 
                                                
24 Simon, Administrative Behavior, 4th Edition., see also Simon et al., Economics, Bounded 
Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution.. 
25 This view gained most respect with the empirical findings of Kahnemann and Tversky (see for 
instance, Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow.) 
26 This particular thesis is most recently championed by the ‘abc’ research group from Max 
Planck institute in Berlin (see, for instance, Bouissac, “Bounded Rationality”; Gigerenzer, 
Adaptive Thinking.) 
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developed conceptual tools? I claim that this is not quite the case yet. Scratch the surface 
of the prevailing discourse in ethics today, and an image similar to Murdoch’s will 
show.27 There will be a computational device with a driver inside, a mind that calculates 
options like a Bayesian machine, with payoffs specified by moral rules—and there will 
be a little homunculus on top of it, in charge of the process and execution, taking care 
that all this fuss is happening for the benefit of someone, or is done is done by someone. 
My goal in this part is to re-expose the shopping view as the persistent 
metaphorical understructure of our thinking about practical reflection. I want to look at 
the way we sort and utilize common (and not so common) intuitions in mainstream 
metaethics, and show that the current direction projects a primitive model that ultimately 
devalues the achievements of moral theory.  
I do not argue, however, that this ‘GOFAI plus driver’ model is openly endorsed. 
It is rather enduring only as a deep and unconscious structure that governs our theories of 
practical thinking. Much like the cognitive theorists Lakoff and Johnson (who are often 
quoted, but hardly taken seriously) , I believe that most thinking is to some degree 
metaphorical, and that, specifically, “It is virtually impossible to think or talk about the 
mind in any serious way without conceptualizing it metaphorically.”28 They identify a 
number of GOFAI-related structures that we apply to thinking about the mind, such as ‘A 
                                                
27 This is, curiously, less true about meta-ethics, and more true about ethics, as if the theory of 
how we should conceive of agency had little effect on the actual conception of agency employed 
in ethical inquiry.  
28 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 235. 
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Line of Thought is a Path” (linear view of processing) or ‘Ideas are Entities with 
Independent Existence” and ‘Ideas are Locations’ (beliefs are discrete data, stored in 
long-term memory).29 Lakoff and Johnson believe that the ultimate source of metaphors 
that are central to our thinking is the bodily experience30—and that is, to simplify their 
view, why for upright, fall-averse bipeds like us ‘up’ will always be better than ‘down’ 
across pretty much any sort of semantic field. There is a deep and obvious truth in it. 
Perhaps the persistence of the GOFAI model which I profess is not a sign of a misguided 
allegiance, but a testimony to some deep fact about our biological nature. This possibility 
certainly needs to be investigated—and, in case it were true, the benefits of retaining the 
computational model should be reexamined, and its status renegotiated. 
But I also believe that Richard Rorty was right, to an extent at least, when he 
criticized philosophers for their all-too-desperate (and yet mostly unconscious) allegiance 
to “…literalizations of what once were accidentally produced metaphors,”31 suggesting 
that vocabularies can change, thereby changing the central system of metaphorical 
templates that users of language depend on in the structuration of their though. At least 
some of the metaphors can be gradually replaced, or rendered less potent, provided that 
there is a good reason for that (in Rorty’s system the reason would be somewhat 
Hegelian—a moment might come where a particular vocabulary is no longer useful, 
fitting or inspiring, and a poet, or a philosopher, has an opportunity to reimagine the most 
                                                
29 Ibid., 236. 
30 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By. 
31 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 61. 
  
24 
basic metaphorical structures). Even if there is a justification from biological determinism 
for this particular metaphor, we might still be able, even if only to a certain extent, to 
assist Rortian ‘poets’ such as Freud and Marx, in finishing their quest for a non-
computational vision of the practical mind. We should actively try, in fact: if a paradigm 
is being openly rejected, obviously empirically inadequate, explanatorily unhelpful; if we 
also have the belief that there is a value in empirically informed ethical models related, 
among other things, to the guiding potential of a theory, we have all the signs we need to 
conclude that that the residue of its influence should be exposed, tackled and, if possible, 
replaced.  
2.  Tortoise  (and Hare,  too)  
Before I go on to tracing the problematic model in existing theories of practical 
thinking, I want to spend some time on putting a slightly more vivid face on the enemy.  
Let me call those who are relying on the GOFAI model of practical reason 
‘Tortoises’. The famous Aesop’s tale, quoted at the beginning of part I, presents the 
Tortoise as the good guy: he sets out to win the race, and, due to the unrelenting nature of 
his commitment to the game, ends up first at the finish line. The Tortoise is a von 
Neumann machine, with linear processing of action-related data—not the most efficient 
way to figure out what to do, but a sure way to get you where you want to be 
(eventually). The premise of his practical reasoning, namely that he needs to win the race, 
remains a stable reference throughout the way—there are, it seems, no parallel processes 
happening in his little reptile mind. Slow, not very relatable, and yet boringly reliable, the 
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Tortoise embodies the GOFAI view of decision-making mechanism that produces 
successful action.  
Contrary to popular opinion, Tortoises are not very easy to spot. A Tortoise, even 
when pressed, will likely not confess his true commitments to a certain vision of the 
agential mind. Thus it might be helpful to gather some clues as to what overt claims 
might possibly indicate that we have just met a Tortoise. 
Let me go back to Murdoch’s image of a shopper as a helpful tool to identifying a 
Tortoise view. The shopping scenario conveniently contained three things: first, some 
assumptions about agent’s psychology (she was acting ‘freely’, she was able to withhold 
action until her deliberation was done, her beliefs and desires belonged in different 
books, etc.) Second, it hinted at the existence of a method of determining the right course 
of action (weighing pros and cons), and, third, it (metaphorically) presented the context 
of action in the form of an organized warehouse. Though likely interdependent within a 
theory, these three kinds of claims have separate foci. Thus at times, it will be useful to 
think of them as separate; for those occasions let me label them t-psychology, t-method 
and t-landscape, respectively. These labels need not to be rigidly defined; they are just 
broad labels that serve as a pragmatic tool for pointing at some aspects of particular 
theories. 
Tortoises are likely, then, to make certain kinds of claims about human 
psychology—these will be their assumptions about the way the human mind functions 
when going about its agential affairs. These claims will have descriptive character and are 
most obviously vulnerable to arguments from experimental psychology and neuroscience. 
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Sometimes they will be made overtly, for instance when M. Bratman begins his analysis 
by saying that we are, as humans, capable of making plans32—that is a straightforward 
descriptive claim about the way we are wired. But they will also often be carried within a 
normative assertion: if a hypothetical Tortoise, for instance, submits that “A good agent 
performs Handel’s Hallelujah before each action,” she probably remembers G. E. 
Moore’s observation that “ought” implies “can,”33 and thus she effectively claims that 
one can in fact sing Hallelujah when an action calls. This, depending on how exactly she 
sees a satisfying performance of the oratorio, can imply that agents are capable of 
memorizing tunes, are generally not tone-deaf, or that their motivating drives can be 
successfully suspended and not acted upon for the duration of the singing.  
A Tortoise knows, like everyone else, that humans do not always seem cool-
headed, rational or cognitively capable of performing the GOFAI type of deliberative 
exercise. Thus the claims of t-psychology will typically be aimed at squaring the 
shopping image with the impurities of actual conduct. Since our minds at first glance 
seem to be not only capable of deliberation, but also of silly humor and imagining 
unicorns, a Tortoise will likely claim that practical reflection is effectively limited to a 
small subset of cognitive affairs. Jokes and unicorn-related musings will be called the 
lesser denizens of the thinking machinery, while the von Neumannesque element will be 
glorified, encouraged, and (often) elevated to the position of the ‘true’ agent.   
Since a Tortoise encourages the usage of the said subset as the vehicle for action-
                                                
32 Bratman, “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency.” 
33 G E Moore, Moore Ethics., see also: Russell, “Ought Implies Can.” 
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related thinking, he must also assume that such move is psychologically possible. One of 
the ways in which we can spot a Tortoise is by his distrustful attitude towards those 
elements that are often effective in conduct, but are hard to incorporate in a 
computational framework. Traditionally, these elements were passions, habits, automatic 
actions, etc., basically those elements that can move us to do things before the computing 
process is done. Thus a Tortoise must favor the idea that temporary suspension of 
motivational forces is possible—or, that there can be room made for computational 
deliberation. That suggests, since desires will be conceived as relevant information for 
the computational effort, that they can be conceived as movement-independent 
informational bits, which can be used for the calculation of the right course of action. A 
Tortoise will generally speak of both, desires and beliefs, as independent units of that 
sort, which can be retrieved from memory in order to feed the processing device. In other 
words, Tortoises will often allude that mental contents are propositional in form, and 
functionally divided (into conative and cognitive), neatly stored in separate cabinets.  
“T-method” will refer (again, roughly) to this subset of the Tortoise view that is 
concerned with the procedure that must be used for making the right choice of action—
the deliberative method. Since the procedure, or the algorithm, is at the very center of the 
GOFAI model, it will be, one can assume, pretty important for a Tortoise to give that 
procedure a prominent place in action modeling. Hence Tortoise frequent preference for 
procedural view on rational action: they can easily believe that agency can be secured by 
following a certain method, an algorithm or a set of steps. When Kant asserts that free 
agency can only be achieved if the will adheres to a universalizable maxim, it is not the 
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mere feature of that maxim’s universalizability that makes it right for an agent to act on 
it. It is rather the agent’s deliberative journey that must expose this fact about the maxim 
in question; only once deliberation is properly performed, the will can be genuinely 
motivated by the so discovered duty.34 The von Neumann machine must be, then, set in 
motion, used, rather than handed the right answer.  
Deontological universalizability is perhaps the most famous example of a 
procedure that, if correctly followed, produces genuine agency as the output, but most 
other theorists have a version of such a procedure, too; they range from the Bayesian 
calculation, through practical syllogisms to ‘weighing reasons’. A Tortoise is, however, 
not stupid, and knows that sometimes even the most carefully designed procedures seem 
to produce undesirable results. Here, in order to detect a Tortoise, we must look for the 
general attitude towards such occurrence. Is the candidate Tortoise bemoaning this fact, 
lamenting, Calvin-style, the wretched design of the fallen creature, who is too flawed to 
use the light of reason properly, because “The light still shines in the darkness, but the 
darkness comprehends it not” [John1:5]? Is he looking for ways to render the algorithm 
more precise by increasing its complexity (such as inclusion of context-indexication, 
encoding emotional processes, etc)? Either reaction indicates that we might have just met 
a Tortoise.  
Now, if we think of a Tortoise agent as an avatar in a computer game of 
adventure, t-psychology will describe its pre-established capacities, such as the ability to 
stop before the next step is decided. For t-method, a player could look into a 
                                                
34 Kant, Groundwork 
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‘walkthrough’, where helpful tips specify how the next courses of action should be 
determined (for instance, “killing a werewolf is worth 50 points, while killing a dragon is 
worth 100. You have only 20% chances of killing a dragon, while there is 60% chance 
you will successfully fight the werewolf. Focus on werewolves until you collect the 
golden hatchet and increase your chances with the dragon by 40%”). In this analogy, 
“landscape” will be all that furnishes the game’s fantasy world: the way the missions are 
structured, the rules that govern the physics, the way in which some fragments of the 
world are salient (if werewolves can kill you, they are salient; if mockingbirds cannot be 
interacted with and fly the digital skies for solely aesthetic purposes, they are probably 
not salient). Each philosophical game of rational agency comes with a landscape of sorts: 
actions are either metaphysically discrete or their borders can be gerrymandered through 
a choice of description. The game might require you to be in motion lest you will be 
killed, or it provides an opportunity to stop, save and think before the next move is due. 
Your results can be a direct function from certain variables, such as correct application of 
a procedure or a number of minutes devoted to reflection, but there also can be luck 
programmed into the scheme in various amounts, and all you can do is trying to diminish 
the chances of being eaten by werewolves. The salient elements might be limited to the 
agent herself, but they can include other agents, social norms, physical forces. T-
landscape is, then, the tacit model of the world on the basis of which a Tortoise thinker 
built her view of practical reflection.  
A Tortoise, since he is committed to the GOFAI metaphor of generating action 
will likely see the world as furnished with discrete options—only in this way the best 
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course of action can be computed. He will speak in a language that presumes, or alludes 
to the existence of fixed values that mark each of the choices. Metaphysical realism about 
values is one way to secure getting the properly formatted data for the von Neumann 
machine, but in fact anything that provides fixed values will do—for instance, as 
internalists would prefer, a relation of a given course of action to the agent’s motivational 
set.  
Here is an important structural fact: it is immediately visible that the claims 
within each set are not necessarily logically connected, and neither are particular sets of 
claims with one another. As a Tortoise, you can be picky and treat them as distinct 
theoretical units: you can, for instance, pick some claims from t-method and renounce t-
psychology altogether.35 Neither set is a theory in the logical sense of the word (it would 
be, if it contained n claims and all their logical consequences). They are, one can say, 
torn bags filled with pretty random stuff, tied together with the general direction of 
reference. And, as a Tortoise, you can engage particular claims within the sets in different 
combinations and to different degrees, mostly without risking logical contradiction. That 
said, the modules still are commonly (through philosophical habit, for instance) co-
dependent, frequently mutually reinforcing, and often, in concrete Tortoise theories, 
presented as logically connected.36  
                                                
35 As rational action theory in economics does, for instance.  
36 It is not difficult to see how that happens. The belief in the existence of specific psychological 
faculties or properties might easily determine the way you view deliberation—but on the flip-
side, sometimes it is your faith in the efficacy, or rightness, of a particular way of decision-
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Does it not seem, then, that in a situation like this it would be better to deal with 
sub-Tortoises, classes of theories that subscribe to logically cohesive sub-parts of the 
view? Even though I assert that most of the Tortoise claims listed above stem from the 
underlying reliance on GOFAI type of modeling, the danger is that it is too vague of a 
connection. And if one is not convinced by my suggestion that these types of claims are 
connected by the way they fit together into a metaphor, my critique might resemble a 
very silly war on all that were born in July, have an uncle in the military and a 
particularly itchy scalp.  
I cannot fully escape this objection; all I can do is to put all my cards on the table 
and admit that (i) there is no way of ‘proving’ my intuition that a metaphorical 
commitment unifies all these claims in some way; a certain amount of evidence is all 
there can be provided,37 and (ii) one of the reasons for my belief in the plausibility of the 
label is a feeling I have about the psychological (not just structural) coherence of these 
kinds of theoretical commitments. A quote from James explains the sort of feeling I rely 
on, when (later in the chapter) I put together, in one category, such different thinkers like 
                                                                                                                                            
making that prompts you to assume a specific view of mind’s moral apparatus. Any theory of 
proper practical reasoning contains a tacit model of reality—we have to, at the very least, have a 
way to individuate between choices of action in order for the concept of deliberation to make any 
sense at all. 
37 Lakoff and Johnson justify their findings regarding the central metaphors behind abstract 
concepts by the analysis of large quantities of text; I will try to provide samples of philosophical 
claims later in the chapter.  
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Korsgaard and Perry, or Bratman and Berker: 
The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human 
temperaments. […]Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so [a 
professional philosopher] urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his 
temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective 
premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more 
sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe […] He trusts his 
temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of 
the universe that does suit it. He feels men of opposite temper to be out of key with 
the world's character, and in his heart considers them incompetent and 'not in it,' in 
the philosophic business, even though they may far excel him in dialectical ability.38 
I believe that James is right, and that temperaments are the main force behind the 
construction of a philosophical theory.  And I also think he is right to say that it is the 
clash of temperaments that generates conflicts more strongly. One of the 
methodologically unacceptable, and yet undeniably convenient tools that I use to detect 
the common thread among those that I named ‘Tortoises’ is ‘emotional probing’: I put 
myself against the candidate theories, and the unity of the feeling of a sudden, deeply felt 
emotional clash, which I experience reading them. This, of course, has no theoretical 
value, and those, who are not convinced, have a full right to reject the idea that the label 
‘Tortoise’ is useful. Perhaps they will become more sympathetic as we go on. If accepted, 
however, this assumption makes my project less of a silly war on a randomly gathered 
                                                
38 William James, Pragmatism, World Publishing Co., 1970 (original 1907). P. 19 
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people and more like a study on individuals with abdominal pains, weekly panic attacks 
and low self-esteem, where logically independent properties turn out to be connected 
genealogically (resulting, in this particular case, from clinical neurosis).  
 I am, thus, convinced that many seemingly independent commitments of a 
Tortoise can be construed as a consequence of a motivational set characteristic of a 
certain type of philosophical attitude, or temperament. This assumption has 
methodological consequences, too—it justifies the search for extra-theoretical 
motivations that could explain seemingly independent commitments.39 But then another 
question arises—who are we really after? Those with a reptile temperament, or theories 
that use GOFAI as the underlying model of processing that leads to a choice of action? 
My belief is that the two things are strongly tied together: a philosophical attitude of a 
certain sort will, I argue, gravitate towards frameworks that ‘sit well’ with the GOFAI 
model. The promise of a unifying and communicable method for choosing actions, and 
the unity of the agent suggested by the linear character of the GOFAI processing, 
together with the normative nature of rule-governed reasoning that this framework 
implies, cater to those temperaments, who fear chaos and uncertainty. The ordo amoris of 
a Tortoise places rules over phronesis, uniformity over personality and answers over 
questions. Their fear is the disintegration of the self, and their concern is self-unification; 
                                                
39 One might ask now, why not define a Tortoise with these ‘extra-theoretical motivations’, but 
through the claims that are only their byproducts? The answer is that it would be disingenuous: I 
can only see claims, and from them I can speculate about motivations, but they are not the 
element that is given.  
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their love is stability and their worse nightmare is moral schizophrenia. Max Scheler 
wrote, “Whether I am investigating the innermost essence of an individual, a historical 
era, a family, a people, a nation or any other sociohistorical group, I will know and 
understand it most profoundly when I have discerned the system of its concrete value 
assessments and value preference […]Whoever has the ordo amoris of a man has the man 
himself […] he has a spiritual model of the primary source which secretly nourishes 
everything emanating from this man.”40 A Tortoise’s ordo amoris is not well hidden. She 
is constantly nourished by the vision of a stable, controllable method of action choice, 
incorporated into the very nature of the acting self, the kind of practical reason that could 
have been modeled on the old-fashioned AI conception of intelligence. When she must 
give it up, she gives it up with sadness, and whenever she can bring it into a theory, she 
does so with joy. 
I have been defining a Tortoise depending on her claims and the motivations for 
accepting them, hoping that my exposition will be a sufficiently good guide for phronetic 
classification. But at times I might be useful to know that there could be a sharper tool of 
classification. For those occasions, I will assume that all of the components, t-
psychology, t-method and t-landscape, consist of a perhaps large, but nonetheless finite 
number of claims. Let us call the set of all these claims T0. Note that T0 is a fairly wild 
set, where all minor and larger claims are accepted, including claims C1 and C2, where C2 
is a logical consequence of C1. Imagine that we now can use an algorithm that would 
purge T0 of all the unnecessary claims like C2 and end up with a more concise set of 
                                                
40 Scheler, "Ordo Amoris" in: Selected Philosophical Essays, 100. 
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claims T.41 Now we can conceive of the term in question as a kind of cluster concept, 
where a theory is Tortoise if and only if it contains no less than a certain number of these 
claims (I, of course, do not know the exact number, but I can say this: it is definitely at 
least three and we might determine it with time. And I can also say that more often than 
not every Tortoise will accept claims from at least two modules, but that is not specified 
by this definition, especially because the borders of modules are vague and some claims, 
once rephrased slightly, can float). 42 
                                                
41 We could use the following algorithm: we pick a claim (for instance Cn) from T0 and put it in 
T. Now, we pick another claim from T0 (Cm) and check whether Cm is a consequence of Cn. If 
yes, then we do not take it in, and we move to the next claim from T0. If not, we check whether 
Cn is a consequence of Cm. If yes, we exchange Cn for Cm, if not, both are in. For each next tested 
claim, both steps have to be repeated for each claim already in T.  And, of course, we go on until 
we attended to each claim in T0. One serious advantage of defining T through this algorithm is 
that is takes the burden of unbearable neatness in submitting candidate Tortoise claims — I am 
only building T0. 
42 Note that this definition abstracts from the motivational considerations, so wildly advertised 
before as that what lies at the heart of a Tortoise view. This should alert the reader to a possible 
problem with my analysis (I, of course, consider it merely a feature). If all Tortoises can be 
effectively picked out solely by the claims they make, and a Tortoise has certain set of 
motivations for holding these claims, one of the following must be true: (i) in a strike of 
extensional felicity, it is a great (and pure) coincidence that everyone accepting these claims also 
happens to have certain motivations that I am describing, (ii) these claims necessarily cannot be 
held without that kind of motivation, (iii) I am making a fairly strong assumption that these 
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And now a plot twist: this particular disjunctive definition comes with one 
necessary condition, a sine qua non for admission into the Tortoise club: every Tortoise, 
as I will explain later, believes that there are genuine ‘actions’ and ‘non-actions’. The 
definition can, thus, be sufficiently well expressed in the following way (with Θ denoting 
the property of being a Tortoise theory, and C is the property of containing a specific 
claim (1, 2, 3, etc.) from set T): 
Θ(Th) ó C1(Th) ∧ {[C2(Th) ∧ C3(Th) ∧ C4(Th)] ∨ [C2(Th) ∧ C3(Th) ∧ C5(Th)] ∨ 
[….]}43 
That will be, I hope, sufficient for understanding the idea of ‘Tortoiseness’. But 
what I would most want the reader to keep in mind as we go on is the guiding image of a 
shopper. The image, that is, of the disembodied shopper, easily replaceable with any 
other similarly rational one; a shopper with externalizable, propositionally conceived 
                                                                                                                                            
particular claims are mostly (but not necessarily) held because of such motivations.  (i) is 
obviously barely possible, and even if it were, no advantage for understanding a Tortoise would 
come from thinking about her motives; (ii) is very improbable, so it must be (iii). I am making the 
assumption that certain kinds of philosophers, given the historical and psychological 
contingencies that brought all of us here, are very likely to hold on to certain claims because of 
certain motives. And I am guilty, I am sure of them, of misattributing and overgeneralizing this 
motivations. More often that not, I am imagining a more coherent, Tortoise, a Platonic version, if 
you will, and re-imagine his character.  
43 The number of disjuncts is finite and it lists all three-element, four-element (all the way to n-1 
element, where n is the number of claims in T) combinations from T.  
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cognitive contents, who suspends her needs and wants for the time of deliberation, and 
whose choice, though procedurally conducted, is an inevitable destiny—a function from 
beliefs, desires and the one good method. It offers a touchstone of what a Tortoise will 
like and dislike about a theory of agency, and what she will try to preserve even in radical 
improvements. Incomplete as this image is, it gives us (I hope) an imperfect tool of 
understanding a Tortoise’s theoretical moves, the meaning of her trade-offs and the 
direction of her hopes, and thus equips us with both, the boldness to challenge her 
deepest assumptions and the respect for her impulses. 
3.  The secret  shopping 
The task at hand is, then, to find traces of Tortoises in metaethical thought, and 
show that they (i) exist, (ii) can be plausibly described in terms of reliance on the GOFAI 
metaphor, (iii) argue against the GOFAI view of the practical mind. How can one go 
about finding them? Following Lakoff and Johnson, and their method of extracting the 
guiding metaphors from language, I should probably begin by taking an inconspicuous 
piece of philosophical text that concerns moral choice, and see what is implied by the 
way it is written.  
Consider, for instance, the following exposition of a morally charged situation by 
philosophers Kearns and Star: 
“Imagine you are walking along a busy road, deep in thought, and someone 
suddenly pushes you over… Suppose this person tells you that he has just saved 
your life by pushing you out of the way of a fast-traveling bus ... He also tells you 
that he almost didn’t push you and thereby save your life because he is in a great 
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hurry to get to a meeting. You thank him profusely, and he hurriedly goes on his 
way. It seems that a natural [emphasis mine] way of describing what just happened 
in this scenario is to say that this stranger considered the reasons for and against 
helping you and he made a quick judgment that, given the balance of reasons in 
play, he really ought to save you. No description of this kind would be appropriate if 
the person who pushed you over had simply accidentally tripped.44   
It is hardly a surprising way to begin an article. This kind of framing of moral 
problems seems to have remained the same since Hampshire was told off by Murdoch. 
What can be unpacked from this quote?  
First, the authors’ emphasis on the thinking process implies that the natural state 
of an agent is a Tortoise-like stillness of decision making, not practical engagement with 
actual action. So many moral dilemmas of philosophical protagonists play out in slow 
motion, where a drowning baby can hold its breath long enough to survive through the 
agent’s efforts to weigh the pros and cons of jumping into the lake. It is a sign that 
processing is considered as more salient than, and separate from, performing. Second, the 
processing of perceptions, if we take this way of speaking at its face value, is utterly 
divorced from the situation at hand and considers stable data sets (like, for instance, 
beliefs about respective moral values of the competing action choices). The final decision 
emerges at the output slot as the result of the calculative process that took place in an 
abstract von Neumann space, where there is no time pressure or emotional stress, and 
where cognitive overload is only a scary story told to sleepy neurons at the end of the 
day. Third, actions are described as discrete options, tokens of types, and thus 
                                                
44 Kearns and Star, “Reasons,” 31. 
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underdescribed—we do not know, for instance, whether the stranger rescues you 
“exasperatedly, respectfully or resentfully.”45  
But perhaps it is too harsh to accuse theorists like Kearns and Star, who after all 
have a reasonable particularist bent, of a tendency towards a GOFAI-type of decision-
making model. It is after all nothing like, say, Audi’s firm perspective on practical 
deliberation: 
The overall theory of practical reasoning proposed takes practical reasoning as an 
inferential process with both motivational and cognitive premises. It corresponds to 
a practical argument, which, in turn, is a kind of argument appropriately produced in 
answering a practical question. Practical reasoning is indeed an inferential 
realization of such an argument”46 
Perhaps, but even particularists, Murdoch’s natural allies, who are supposed to be 
sensitive to the organic and hardly formalizable cooperation of the agent and her context 
for the issuing of action, are not free of the secret Tortoise love for the computational 
approach. Or maybe even not that secret. Below, Andrea Lechrer defends particularist 
conception of reasons against Selim Berker’s accusations of the lack of coherence. 
Berker is, according to Lechrer, guilty of assuming that there can only be one 
combinatorial function (which “…takes as input the valence and weight of all the reasons 
present in a given possible situation and gives as output the rightness or wrongness of 
each action available in that situation”47) for the calculation of the net reason for action in 
                                                
45 Rorty, Mind in Action., p. 284 
46 Audi, Practical Reasoning, 188. 
47 Berker, “Particular Reasons,” 103. 
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a given situation. But, apparently, there are 
“…two functions. One of them (what he calls the “total reason function”) yields for 
each action the total reason in favor of the action on the basis of the relevant 
contributory reasons. The second function determines whether an action is right or 
wrong on the basis of the total reason in its favor and the total reason in favor of 
alternative options. For instance, one’s total reason function might tell one to add up 
the weights of all the reasons in favor of an action and subtract from this sum the 
weights of the reasons against the action. The second function, in turn, might specify 
that the right action is that with the highest amount of total reason in its favor.”48 
A particularist, on this view, does pretty much the same thing that the kind 
stranger in the quote above, except her task is a little harder—the possible actions are still 
extensionally described and with values attached, but their final worth depends on 
complicated relations with a number of context-specific variables.  
The bizarre thing is that this sort of computation seems arduous and ineffectual: it 
appears to be both, computationally taxing and hardly useful for increasing the moral, or 
other, worth of the subsequent action—let alone phenomenologically familiar. Were the 
brain asked to perform such exercise every time a choice is called for, the energy 
expenditure would be dangerously high. The redundant character of adequately diligent 
‘weighing’ reminds me of a character named Dodecahedron, from Norton Juster’s book 
for children Phantom Tollbooth.49 It is a story of a boy named Milo, and a very useful 
piece of literature, because it offers the kind of absurdity that does not derive its power 
                                                
48 Lechler, “Do Particularists Have a Coherent Notion of a Reason for Action?”. 
49 Juster, The Phantom Tollbooth. 
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from playing with chaos,50 but from highlighting, augmenting and utilizing the tacit 
structures and metaphors that habitually govern our ways of thinking. Dodecahedron 
suddenly appears when Milo and his friends are trying to choose one of the three roads 
leading to the city. When Milo asks, “Perhaps you can help us decide which road to 
take”, he officiously delivers, in the form of a question: 
“By all means (…) There’s nothing to it. If a small car carrying three people at thirty 
miles an hour for ten minutes along a road five miles long at 11:35 in the morning 
starts at the same time as three people who have been travelling in a little automobile 
at twenty miles an hour for fifteen minutes on another road exactly twice as long as 
one half the distance of the other, while a dog, a bug, and a boy travel an equal 
distance in the same time or the same distance in an equal time along a third road in 
mid-October, then which one arrives first and which is the best way to go?”51  
 Now, that is a long way to say which way is the longest, especially when they are, 
it seems, all the same in length. I have a nagging feeling that by the time the net reason 
for action is determined or Dodecahedron is done, anyone in their right mind would 
already be driving down one of the three roads for just about any available reason (and by 
the time Kearns and Star’s sweet stranger weighs all his considerations, your wife is in 
the bank, cashing your life insurance).  
Fine, one might say; perhaps there is something about the ubiquity of your Tortoises, 
and the resulting persistence of the computational view of the mind in ethics. But here are 
two good objections to your interpretation of the meaning of this fact. First, it might be 
                                                
50 Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s adventures in Wonderland would be an instance of that, I guess.  
51 Juster, The Phantom Tollbooth, 127. 
  
42 
more peripheral than you make it to be. You yourself said that the GOFAI model has 
been updated and developed; instead of taking the easy way of focusing on hardly 
representative quotes, you could look at one of those accounts that truly attempt to reject 
the old fashioned calculation; if you found the GOFAI way there, it would be at least 
somewhat informative. Second, you might be accusing some theories of descriptive 
faults, when they are in an entirely different business. Even if ethics does sometimes 
speak of agents as if they were calculating devices that process the values of the 
extensionally described courses of action in the light of the stored data such as beliefs and 
desires, they might be engaged in one of the following practices: (i) building an idealized 
model of action-generation mechanism for explanatory purposes, (ii) building a distorted 
model with the valuable feature of cross-subjective communicability, (iii) constructing, 
not describing (not even in the sense of structurally adequate model-building) an 
essentially political tool that facilitates beneficial uniformization of behavior-related 
institutions.  
Let me start with the first objection. I want to argue that the shopping image is what 
generates and maintains the theoretical development of most mainstream theories of 
action. But yes, there are notable instances of theorists that go against it, and try to 
introduce the right measure of psychology into a computational perspective on the action-
generating apparatus.  
Consider, for instance, Nomy Arpaly—a philosopher who built her career on 
providing thoughtful arguments against the standard GOFAI model, a true hero of the 
anti-Tortoise movement. If we believe in the efficacy of the computational mind, we 
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should generally desire that an agent follows whatever the system judges to be the best 
thing to do, all things considered—or for her to follow the ‘best judgment’. There has 
been a lot of philosophy written on the best judgment issue—and the driving force behind 
the concern with the best judgment must be the idea that there is a fairly precise function 
from the set of beliefs and desires of an agent to an appropriate action choice in a given 
context.  
The best judgment is a clever device: it relativizes the rightness of the choice of 
action to the particular agent and her epistemic situation (what is not in the data storage 
cannot possibly be ‘considered’), while in the same time providing the taste of 
universality of the method—a prerequisite for any self-respecting GOFAI model (should 
you have the same choice, same beliefs and goals, you must make the very same choice, 
insofar as you are rational). Arpaly observes, however, that the procedure for arriving at 
the best judgment is not always getting you where you want to be (say, in aisle 11 of our 
shop, right by the product that is so right for you). Oftentimes, she claims, it appears that 
the best thing to do is to act against one’s best judgment; that a ‘fit’ of irrationality can be 
a better choice than complying with the results of careful deliberation.  
That is a hopeful nod towards a non-computational view of the agential mind, a 
recommendation to drop the Dodecathedron’s way and choose the right road with your 
gut. The anecdotal agents starring in Arpaly’s argument are people, who formulate the 
best judgment according to the rules of the techne, but end up acting otherwise. Her 
description of a hypothetical agent Emily goes in the following way: 
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Emily's best judgment has always told her that she should pursue a PhD in 
chemistry. But as she proceeds through the graduate program, she starts feeling 
restless, sad and ill-motivated to stick to her studies. These feelings are triggered by 
a variety of factors, which let us suppose, are good reasons for her, given her desires 
and beliefs, not to be in the program. The kind of research that she is expected to do, 
for example,  [would] not allow her to fully exercise her talents, she does not possess 
some of the talents the program requires, and the people who seem most happy in 
the program are very different from her in their general preferences and character. 
All these factors she notices and registers, but they are also something that she 
ignores when she deliberates about the rightness of her choice of vocation: like most 
of us, she tends to find it hard, even threatening, to take a leave of a long-held 
conviction and to admit to herself the evidence against it. But every day […] her 
restlessness grows, her sense of dissatisfaction grows, and she finds it harder to 
motivate herself to study. Still when she deliberates, she concludes that her feelings 
are senseless and groundless. One day, on an impulse, propelled exclusively by her 
feelings, she quits the program, calling herself lazy and irrational, but also 
experiencing an inexplicable sense of relief. Years later, happily working elsewhere, 
she suddenly sees the reasons for her bad feelings of old, cites them as the reasons 
for her quitting and regards as irrationality not her quitting, but, rather, the fact that 
she held on to her conviction that the program was right for her as long as she did.52 
Arpaly does seems to respond to Murdoch’s call for a moral philosophy “…which 
can speak significantly of Freud and Marx.” She is remarkably respectful of Emily’s 
(and, by extension, any agent’s) natural psychological mechanisms, and, instead of 
squeezing Emily into a all too tight and energy-expensive model, she extends it so that 
this clearly-not-insane Emily can be comfortably and duly accommodated. Thus one can 
choose to see Arpaly’s effort to veer away from t-method as a sensible adjustment of a 
theory that neglected some features of human psychology, to wit, the difficulty in 
                                                
52 Arpaly, “On Acting Rationally Against One’s Best Judgment,” 504. 
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accessing relevant data from within the mind. A von Neumann machine is self-
transparent, and so is our shopping friend from the beginning of this chapter—but 
Arpaly’s Emily is not. It seems we have arrived at an example of a theory that does not 
see computational processing as the natural skill of the mind, and, by extension, as the 
regulative ideal for deliberation about action.  
There is, however, a slightly different, and no less plausible perspective on what 
is going on. First, Arpaly, like so many other theorists of rational action,53 clearly 
appreciates Emily’s struggle to formulate the best judgment. Her concern is not that 
Emily approaches the problem in the wrong way; rather, she is worried that the method of 
Bayesian calculation, while the best we have got, is not fool-proof when used by a 
psychologically flawed creature. No matter how many times Emily tries to formulate the 
best judgment, diligently following a prescribed step-by-step process, there will always 
be cases where the structure of her psyche will render the whole process quite useless, 
and the outcome will be unsatisfying. Why is it the case? Emily, like all of us, is a victim 
of Freud: her mind sometimes refuses to release important information. The connection 
between her long-term memory and working memory is sometimes clogged, and for 
every ten easily retrievable beliefs, there will be one or two firmly jammed in its log-term 
                                                
53  Kahnemann’s view comes to mind here as an example of a theory that points at the 
incongruence between the GOFAI view of deliberate action and the unfortunate shortcomings of 
actual agential behavior. In Kahnemann’s world, every struggle towards Bayesian rationality is 
valuable; every achievement of the computationally correct choice is an occasion to rejoice. 
Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow. 
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memory drawer.  
Were Arpaly not influenced by the old myth of GOFAI processing, she would 
have ended her story here, saying that there is no algorithmic method for choosing action 
rationally, full stop. She might have added that the concern with an action’s rationality 
will not take us very far in terms of theory of agency, or even in terms of adequate self-
assessment and the judgment of others. Perhaps, to illustrate the unfortunate but not 
eliminable vagueness of agential guidelines she would have had quoted Freud himself, 
who turns the problem with the inaccessible data into a theory of the mind, which then 
served as a justification for an intuitive ‘method’ of decision-making: 
“When making a decision of a minor importance, I have always found it 
advantageous to consider all the pros and cons. In vital matters, however, such as the 
choice or a mate or a profession, the decision should come from the unconscious, 
from somewhere within ourselves. In the important decisions of our life we should 
be governed, I think, by the deep inner needs of our nature”54 
Instead, Arpaly is so disappointed with the sudden loss of a function that infallibly 
determines the right action from the set of desires and beliefs that she takes her GOFAI 
processing elsewhere: outside of an agent. She will remain a Tortoise at least partially, 
with t-psychology renounced, but with t-method intact. 
“There are at least two ways to think of theorizing about rationality. One way is to 
see the idea theory of rationality as providing us with a manual of sorts: follow these 
instructions, and you will always make a rational decision […] Another way is to see 
                                                
54 Freud, cited after Dijksterhuis, Think different: The merits of unconscious thought in preference 
development and decision making.  
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theorizing about rationality as aiming […] at providing us simply with a theory — a 
theory that tells us when people act rationally and when they do not, so that given a 
God's eye view of a person's circumstances, beliefs and motives, one would be able 
to tell how rational or irrational said person would be in performing a certain 
action. These two fascinating tasks—to which I will refer as the creation of a 
rational agent's manual and the creation of an account of rationality—are more 
different than they look.”55 
Arpaly’s dissatisfaction with Emily’s well-reasoned choice (it simply does not 
square well with what Arpaly believes is the right thing to do) leads her to abandon the 
quest for the ‘manual’ as a lost cause, and switch to the ‘account of rationality’, where the 
problems of psychology are no longer relevant. The two tasks, I believe, are not as 
different as Arpaly would want us to think, at least they are not that different in the way 
she tackles them herself. The ‘account’ is but a vision of an idealized agent, who happens 
to be fully lucid and absolutely self-transparent, with the ability to process the accessible 
data according to the moral algorithm—and in the case of this sort of agent the ‘best 
judgment’ method (described in the ‘manual’) would indeed be fool-proof. We are still in 
the same shop, with the same two notebooks, except that this time they have coffee 
spilled all over and we are perhaps better off, for now, ceding the shopping onto an 
assistant, who kept his copies of our data intact. Let him be the agent we all want.  
In Arpaly’s account, actions are, discretely, laid out in front of an agent as 
possible choices. There exists a method of arriving at the right choice that can be 
conceptualized in an algorithmic manner and stored in the computational device like 
instructions in a computer. And the GOFAI model has been taken out of the mind and 
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posited as a regulative ideal, towards which the flawed agential machine should strive.  
It seems, therefore, that the recognition of some psychological features of agents 
does not safeguard a theorist from the commitment to a GOFAI-inspired view of agential 
mind. Arpaly exported the von Neumann machine outside of Emily and her lot, and hand 
it to God, or a bird and her view, as a measurement of their performances. But she could 
also have a less aspirational view on how action should be generated, and do what Jesus 
would—embrace human processing device with all its flaws. Perhaps to model practical 
intelligence truly means to model Emily, not an abstracted, self-transparent entity. The 
problem is that it would be easily doable. GOFAI architecture of data processing can be 
quite accommodating. To simulate Emily on a von Neumannesque machine we can make 
just a few little adjustments: introduce an instruction that sometimes shuts the processor’s 
access to a small subset of data and, in cases when the decision at hand requires some 
input from that closed subset, change a method of computing the best judgment from a 
Bayesian one to random, or vaguely probabilistic.  
This is precisely why so many ‘improvements’ over the shopping scenario are in 
fact cases of replicating the old fashioned AI paradigm in modeling—we can always 
imagine a Bayesian interpretation of a new input or structural limitations. We can, for 
instance, recognize the positive, or necessary role that emotions play in decision 
making—but instead of changing the deep structure of the decision model to include 
emotional forces, we can treat them as a challenge to our coding method. We could, for 
instance, translate them into a function that systematically adds value to certain 
outcomes.  
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It seems, then, that Tortoise sympathies can endure through even quite radical 
framework adjustments. But cui bono? Who benefits from maintaining the primary 
metaphorical pull at the core of the language of rational action? What part of the Tortoise 
psychology is hung up on the linear, computational perspective on practical thinking? 
My guess is that a part of the temperamental make-up of a Tortoise is the desire for 
controlled politics of agency; a desire for a standard that will simultaneously safeguard 
one from moral luck, and put adequate pressure on the citizens of the Tortoise land. A 
GOFAI framework, with its computational demands and one-to-one function from the set 
of beliefs and desires to the best judgment about action provides a Tortoise with a tool 
that secures the firmness of the rules and allows for their imposition. When we demand 
that agents deliberate according to an algorithmic standard, even vaguely specified, we 
gain a normative tool to rule the T-kingdom, simply because, “When practical reasoning 
meets the minimal standards of adequacy, the reason it provides is normative—and so a 
reason for one to act—by virtue of the content of its concluding judgment.”56  
An alternative to the firmness of some kind of computation is, I reckon, a somewhat 
disgusting prospect for a Tortoise. Aurel Kolnai in his beautiful essay On Disgust 
suggested that moral disgust detects not wrongness, not blameworthiness, but 
amorphousness, an internal incapability of strong acceptance of certain hierarchy of 
                                                
56 Barker, “Audi’s Theory of Practical Reasoning,” 44. I am not saying (yet) that it is a bad 
standard, or an unjustified one; I am simply wondering what makes us want a standard of this 
sort.  
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values, lack of firmness, insolidity of the soul.57 A Tortoise, conceivably, cannot give up 
the idea about an algorithmic key to moral agency entirely, without a theoretical 
nausea—especially when the alternatives seem to entail the dissolution of a moral agent 
and her moral community.  
That is, however, pure speculation. The purported authoritarian longing of the 
Tortoise mindset might, nonetheless, become slightly more pronounced when we analyze 
the Tortoise need to distinguish between true actions and non-actions. A stringent theory 
of agency, as I will try to show in the next section, can become a way to create a 
somewhat plausible psychology, where the von Neumann machine does not seem like a 
strange implant, a deus ex machina in the otherwise unruly theatre of the mind, but a 
machina ex deo, a device fully integrated into the arrangement of the soul.  
4.  Act ions  and Shmact ions: 58 generat ing normativ i ty  from the  
not ion of  act ion 
Many people believe that, as far as things go, some things are actions and some other are 
not. A Tortoise is among them—for her the result of the Wittgensteinian subtraction 
(“What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my 
                                                
57 Kolnai, On Disgust. On that view, moral disgust is a true cousin of physical repulsion, which 
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58 This funny term is borrowed from David Enoch (Enoch, “Agency, Shmagency”), and means an 
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51 
arm?”) is always a positive number. It is, I claimed before, a sine qua non condition of 
joining the Tortoise squad.  
In this section I will try to show that the Tortoise approach to this distinction is 
not motivated by a genuine inquiry into the mechanics of action, but aimed at the 
preservation, and justification, of the kind of normativity that springs from the 
commitment to the GOFAI model. This section  is thus aimed to motivationally 
deconstruct the alleged ‘descriptive’ component in Tortoise models, thus further 
justifying the need for exchanging it to a more empirically adequate one.  
Is the belief that there are actions and non-actions in any way problematic? At 
first glance, at least, it makes more than perfect sense. Most theorists of action, in fact, 
both from the side of Tortoises and from the hare party, share this intuition. Consider, for 
instance, the uncontroversial way in which Donald Davidson begins to think about 
agency. “This morning,” he writes, “I was awakened by the sound of someone practicing 
violin. I dozed a bit, then got up, washed, shaved, dressed, and went downstairs, turning 
off a light in the hall, as I passed”. Further on, he pours himself some coffee, stumbles on 
the dining room rug, and then spills some of the coffee while reading the New York 
Times. “Some of these items record things I did; others, things that befell me,” he 
wonders, and adds that in the attempt to sort these things into the two categories, “Many 
examples can be settled out of hand, and this encourages the hope that there is an 
interesting principle at work […]”59 
“Yes,” we might agree—“It does make sense!” But even though Davidson’s 
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words read so smoothly, one thing, I reckon, should not be missed in this quote: there is, 
he says, a ‘hope’ for ‘a principle’. The seeming regularity of, and intuitive confidence in 
linguistic behavior is enough for Davidson to trigger the immediate faith in a deeper 
integrity of the notion of action. If this hope is fulfilled, Davidson’s getting up and 
turning off a light will not be ‘actions’ for different reasons, as (we can easily imagine) 
they could be—they will turn out to be actions because they share a set of features.  
This is, of course, an inclination toward order that we all have; something that 
keeps us going as theorists. If Davidson was a scientist, we could say that sensitivity to 
regularity is a desirable part of the context of discovery, something that makes discovery 
possible at all. But what if this hope—the essentialist hope—becomes so strong that the 
‘sensitivity’ is replaced with headstrong conviction that a principle will be found? It is, I 
believe, the case with Tortoises.  
 One can argue that even if those bad Tortoises indeed do not respond to linguistic 
regularity with adequate caution, it might perhaps warrant a correcting effort, rather than 
a general methodological worry. Assume that the conditions for actions they will offer 
will be too stringent, too broad or somewhat off target. Still their pursuit of the ‘principle’ 
could be similarly laudable as that of Linnaeus, whose categorizations of species was 
enormously helpful for the development of Biology, even though he was unaware of the 
essential fuzziness of the very concept of species—something that we are acutely aware 
of in a neo-Darwinian world.  There are (perhaps only in a sense) actions and non-
actions, just like there are (again, in a sense) fish and jellyfish—why would it be wrong to 
point that out (or try explain how to adequately sort them)? Who has a problem with that?  
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I actually might, provided that someone goes beyond neutral classification of this 
kind, and adds that jellyfish are, by definition, superior, and thus my worth is inversely 
proportional to the number of my scales. I argue that, for a Tortoise, an evaluative 
opportunity opening up with the kind of definitory exercise she employs seems to be a 
strongly motivating reason to give in to the essentialist hope. Tortoises are Tortoises qua 
metaethicists, not qua folk-psychologists, neuroscientists or law practitioners. They are, 
therefore, directly involved in the normative inquiry. They are not asking, what they can 
do to understand human behavior, they are asking what a theory of action can do for their 
main concern. They are not in this business because they are passionate about human 
action generation mechanisms and the secrets of raising arms; they are hoping to buy the 
shares of the enterprise out and invest it in the already pre-ordered concepts of the right 
and the good. It is as if Linnaeus wrote his Flora Lapponica with the sole purpose of 
showing mosses that they are inferior to lichens, and started off by defining mosses as 
“those things clearly superior to lichens”. In a similar manner, a Tortoise hand-pick those 
shoppers who suit her purpose and uses them to postulate an essence that will be used to 
shame the non-complying shoppers. 
How is this done? To find an example we do not have to venture far. I will focus 
on the strategy of argument employed by Christine Korsgaard, one of the most prominent 
Tortoises writing today. Korsgaard, writes, for instance: “Action is self constitution,” and 
adds, without a blink of an eye, “…accordingly, what makes actions good or bad is how 
well they constitute you.”60  
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The interesting thing is that Korsgaard starts off with what seems to be a 
normatively neutral definition of action, perhaps an analytically derived one, perhaps a 
result of generalization from observations61—and, in a movement presented as logically 
inevitable, ends up with a norm. Here is another instance of this strategy: 
“Why is disunity a threat? Why is unity essential to agency? Unity is essential to 
agency, whether collective or individual, because an action, unlike other events 
whose causes in some way run through an agent, is supposed to be a movement, or 
the effecting of a change, that is backed by the agent as a whole.”62 
Once again, what action is supposed to be (a unifying activity) defines the 
possible paths of moral failings (doing something that threatens the unity of an agent). In 
Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant we find yet another instance of the very 
same argument: 
                                                
61 Korsgaard never explains whether she considers her definition to be analytic or synthetic a 
posteriori. At times she writes as if her conception of action was a generalization from particular 
instances of intuitive appraisal of acts (or at least these instances serve here as justifications)—
and hence the analogy to Linnaeus. Her Kantian affiliation could, however, suggest that it arises 
from purely conceptual analysis. My critique is more relevant if the former is the case; 
fortunately, even if she intends to do the latter, the unintuitive result of such analysis keeps her 
from putting her cards on the table, and forces her to seek confirmation from particular 
representative ‘cases’ (Korsgaard, "Self-constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity", “Self-
Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant.”) 
62 Korsgaard, The Normative Constitution of Agency, p. 8. Emphasis mine.  
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The Constitutional Model implies a certain view about what an action is, which in 
turn has implications about what makes an action good or bad. […] [it] tells us that 
what makes an action yours in this way is that it springs from and is in accordance 
with your constitution. But it also provides a standard for good action, a standard 
which tells us which actions are most truly a person's own, and therefore which 
actions are most truly actions. 63 
 A standard of a behaviors fit with an agent’s overall constitution is, then, again 
generated  from the mere appraisal of the phenomenon of agency. In a similar vein, in 
Korsgaard’s interpretation the categorical imperative is binding because it falls out of the 
idea of action (“The categorical imperative is an internal standard for actions, because 
conformity to it is constitutive of an exercise of the will, of an action of a person as 
opposed to an action of something within him”64).  
It is by no means a new way of obtaining a normative component from the 
analysis of (metaphysical or linguistic) facts. It places us back in the familiar Aristotelian 
world, where only once we knew who we were, we were able to know where to go.65 The 
                                                
63 Korsgaard, “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant,” 3. 
64 Ibid., 27. 
65 Korsgaard has recently been admitting to Aristotelian influences affecting her interpretation of 
Kant’s ethics (Korsgaard, Self-Constitution; Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency; Korsgaard, 
„The Origin of the Good and Our Animal Nature”; Korsgaard, “The normative constitution of 
agency”). She found, it seems, a way to use some of Aristotle’s ideas to slightly naturalize 
Kantian ethics, making it more palatable for wider audiences and common sense (specifically, she 
suggests that ethics as conceived by Kant is a fitting conceptualization of the kind of functioning 
that is specific to humans and makes them “do well” in life, and thus it squares with “Aristotle’s 
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idea, as used by Korsgaard, can be summarized in the following way: in a slightly 
modified, post-Aristotelian vernacular66 we might say that, at least in certain cases, the 
knowledge of what X is provides us with a set of conditions that we can use to evaluate 
how good is a certain y such that X(y). In other words, if being a knife means to be able 
to cut, a blunt knife should be sharpened—and to get that “should” we did not have to 
venture anywhere beyond the knife itself. What a relief, since we are, as meta-theorists, 
on the level where normativity should be found, not appealed to. Korsgaard, in David 
Enoch’s words, believes that “…the normative standards relevant for actions will fall out 
of an understanding of what is constitutive of action, just as the normative standards 
relevant for cars fall out of an understanding of what is constitutive of cars.”67 
If this belief were true, venturing into theory of action would be a pretty good 
bargain for a Tortoise. Korsgaard seems to have successfully outmaneuver both, a skeptic 
about morality and Humean methodological police (the public force that keeps ‘ought’ 
and ‘is’ apart). “What do you mean there are no moral standards?” says Korsgaard to the 
former, “Surely you agree that a knife is better sharp (and, while we are on it, action is 
better as self-constitution)?” To the latter, she might say, “I committed no crime, because 
                                                                                                                                            
idea […] that the good for a being consists in the well-functioning of that being as the kind of 
being that it is, in circumstances that are conducive or favorable to its overall  well-functioning.”, 
The Origin of the good and Our Animal Nature, p. 1)  
66 For the most famous instance of the adoption of this idea, see for instance: McIntyre, After 
Virtue—but also all the Korsgaard references listed above.  
67 Enoch, “Agency, Shmagency,” 170. 
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my ‘ought’ is just another expression of my ‘is’. I looked at action, and I saw it for what 
it was; now I have an uncontroversial tool to measure your agential performance. As easy 
as judging knives.”  
Surely, a knife is better sharp. But if (counterfactually) most of knives were in 
fact sharp, this analysis would have meager normative power. A sharp knife in the land of 
sharp knives could only shrug dismissively if a moralist instructed it “Be sharp!”. We 
have a justifiably strong sense that Korsgaard is first, a seeker of normativity, and only 
second an action theorist, and thus this is, for a Tortoise like her, a difficult problem. She 
cannot give in to a definition of action that endows the term with too broad a denotation.  
That is why she must reject what she calls, “The naturalistic conception of agency – that 
an agent is active when her movements are caused or causally guided by her own mental 
states or representations.”68 That category includes, for instance, Davidson’s theory.69 If 
she was to agree with him that action is any event that under some description is 
‘intentional,’ than she would either need to preach sharpness to a legion of laser-
sharpened chef knives, or she would have to give up the entire plan of obtaining a norm 
from the essence of action. Same goes for, say, equating action with consciousness of 
one’s movement,70 and many other conceptions formed through an inquiry that is not 
norm-sensitive. “Agency is not just a particular form of causality”—explains her 
dissatisfaction Korsgaard in a somewhat circular manner, “because causes, just as such, 
                                                
68 Korsgaard, The Normative Constitution of Agency 
69 Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events. Essay 3.  
70 Searle, Intentionality. 
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cannot succeed or fail. It is not immediately obvious how this feature of the concept of 
agency can be captured by an account that explains agency in terms of the causality or 
causal guidance of an appropriate mental state.”71 
 A normativity-seeking Tortoise, therefore, is not going to succeed by merely 
adopting the controversial maneuver of abandoning genuine description in favor of 
questionable teleology. The stratagem can only work if action is defined in a way that 
puts agents under adequate pressure. That is why, for a Tortoise, action must be far 
divorced from non action. Her definition will, thus, always be aspirational: by no means 
a description of something we do, but something that we should do—preferably 
something that squares well with a Tortoise’s prior normative intuitions about what it 
means to morally “succeed or fail”. It makes sense, says Korsgaard, “For when we think 
of agency as something that is normatively constituted, the very idea of an action has a 
certain honorific character”72 
There are two problems with this set-up. The first one is the fairly obvious 
circularity of this strategy, initially advertised as uncontroversial in terms of generating 
normativity. Despite the Aristotle-inspired attempts at naturalization of normativity, 
Korsgaard assumes the standard that she sets out to justify with a definition as a part of 
that definition. The second, larger problem is that of theoretical identity. I imagine that 
despite the “honorific” and aspirational view of agency, a Tortoise metaethicist like 
Korsgaard does not think of herself as someone coming to work as an attorney of a 
                                                
71 Korsgaard, The Normative Constitution of Agency, 10 
72 Korsgaard, The Normative Constitution of Agency, 4. Emphasis mine.  
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standard to be justified at all costs. She must believe that her reflections on the nature of 
agency are genuine and disinterested; she must believe that her description is referring to 
an authentic phenomenon. At the very least she would view an attack on her view that 
pointed out its inability to account for day-to-day agency as legitimate. But then again, 
talking about raising arms and taking showers rather than acts of duty cannot take her 
normativity quest very far—and she is back to the aspirational view.   
Rarely is this problem is addressed head-on.73 Usually, it is solved by means that 
are largely rhetorical. The principles of Tortoise rhetoric instruct them to keep arm-
raising in mind, but talk mostly about being extremely sharp, incredibly keen, so the 
norm will remain to appear as tied to some sort of description. The Tortoise action-
related literature is, therefore, focusing mostly on ‘real’ actions, ‘actions proper’ and ‘true 
expressions of agency’, ‘self-governing agency’ and ‘genuinely autonomous actions’—
seemingly descriptive regulative ideals compared to which ‘normal’ actions can now be 
found wanting (but explained qua actions, the way Plato’s shadows are explained by their 
resemblance to an eidos).  
Consider, for instance, the work of Michael Bratman. He habitually uses this sort 
of rhetoric, trying to concurrently maintain the intuitive advantages of calling arm-raising 
an action and the normative convenience of a strictly aspirational definition. He does talk 
about daily conduct, but that, to him, is not strictly speaking something of philosophical 
                                                
73 In Korsgaard, “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant” Korsgaard is trying to get out 
of the normatively charged definition of action conundrum by saying that “bad actions” are, in a 
way, actions too; they are “The same activity, badly done” [p. 15] 
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interest. He insists instead that humans are capable of more purposeful actions, real 
actions (such as, for instance, self-governance) and writes, “A central problem in the 
philosophy of action is how to understand these stronger forms of agency.”74 He 
frequently refers to a certain sub-class of actions as ‘full-blown’: “…when action is the 
issue of normative deliberation anchored in such an endorsed conception of practical 
identity that there is full-blown agency and not merely an outcome of causal pushes and 
pulls.”75 Here, in a fascinating rhetorical move, Tortoise Bratman reduces the universe of 
activity to ‘super-actions’ on the one hand and ‘causal pulls’ on another—because too 
much attention to the middle of the continuum would hinder the exploitation of action 
theory’s normative potential, available only if in the mind of the reader ‘action’ and 
‘super-action’ get somehow confused. Richard Foley used the same trick, when he wrote, 
“Actions that are done not only intentionally but also deliberately can be regarded as 
actions par excellence, […] [they are] paradigms of actions.”76  Sarah Buss talks about 
“Super-actions”77 This way of speaking allows one to simultaneously feel that they are in 
fact trying to understand all actions for what they are and reject causal theories that are, 
in fact, doing just that.78 And, with all these maneuvers, Wittgenstein’s exercise in 
subtraction is seamlessly exchanged for a different puzzle: what should I add to me 
                                                
74 Bratman, “Three Forms of Agential Commitment,” 329. Emp. Mine. 
75 Bratman, “Two Problems About Human Agency,” 317. 
76 Foley, “Deliberate Action,” 54. 
77 Buss, “Autonomous Action,” July 1, 2012. 
78 I do not mean to declare my support for causal theories here.  
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raising my arm to make it a real action?  
We have, then, the conviction that actions are distinct from non-actions;79 this, in 
turn raises the hope for constitutive normativity for agents—which, consequently, leads 
Tortoises to formulating ‘aspirational’ conceptions, skewed toward normatively charged 
analysis. My goal was only to expose the motivation behind a Tortoise’s drive to first, 
clearly divide actions and non-actions, and secondly, to cling to this folk-psychological 
term as a ring buoy for their normative needs that only works when explicated as a badge 
of honor rather than a property of behavior.  
It is worth mentioning (although it is ultimately a little off topic) that the post-
Aristotelian call of alleged metaphysical destiny has, in fact, a meager normative force. 
The most succinct criticism of this strategy comes from Enoch: 
“At times Korsgaard writes as if she believes that the threat that your inner (and 
outer) states will fail to deserve folk-theoretical names (such as "action") is indeed a 
threat that will strike terror into the hearts of the wicked. But no support is offered 
for this surprising claim. And notice that Korsgaard's problem here is not merely that 
the skeptic is unlikely to be convinced by such a maneuver. The problem runs 
deeper than that because the skeptic should not be convinced. However strong or 
weak the reasons that apply to him and require that he be moral, surely they do not 
become stronger when he realizes that unless he complies with morality his bodily 
movements will not be adequately described as actions.”80 
 Enoch is right, I think, that the skeptic, when designing a house to his liking, 
                                                
79 The definition of action can function either as a clear-cut categorization device, or as a 
touchstone for the “degree” of agency present in a particular behavior.  
80 Enoch, “Agency, Shmagency,” 108. 
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should not be thrown off his course simply because someone says: “This is not what a 
house truly is!” With a normative admonition of this sort the problem is not really about 
defining a house, but giving me reasons to actually build a house rather than whatever I 
set out to make. In Enoch’s words, “…if a constitutive-aim or constitutive-motives theory 
is going to work for agency, then, it is not sufficient to show that some aims or motives or 
capacities are constitutive of agency. Rather, it is also necessary to show that the "game" 
of agency is one we have reason to play”81  
For a short moment let us imagine, however, that the constitutive stratagem could 
work—that the principles of metaphysics have the power to confine moral destiny. Our 
personal metaphysician, a Tortoise, defined action in a way that makes it quite hard to be 
an agent (she needed that as a warrant for normative demands). What happens when the 
bar for ‘fully-blown’ and ‘very real’ agency is set too high, not just for an ordinary Joe, 
but for pretty much all the Joes out there?  
In short, nothing. Once again we can see how the Tortoise strategy sacrifices 
philosophical goods, such as empirical accuracy, genuine explanation of existing 
phenomena and the possibility of actual guidance of real agents, for normativity. When 
                                                
81 Ibid., 186. I think the response from Aristotle-tinted Korsgaard would be that of teleologically 
determined inevitability of  the search for happiness, which can only be fulfilled if the right way 
of life (that of self-constitution and duty) is followed. I think we can safely say that it is, in fact, a 
question the answer to which is at least in part empirical. Evolutionary psychology together with 
experimental psychology are probably in a better position to determine the solution of a problem 
so posed.  
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Kant wrote, “In actual fact it is absolutely impossible for experience to establish with 
complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action … has rested solely on 
moral grounds and on the thought of one's duty,”82 he essentially confessed that this 
worry, for a Tortoise like him, is irrelevant, and if people cannot be proper agents, that 
their problem, not the theory’s. In her Skepticism about Practical Reason, Korsgaard 
argues the Kantian point about the coextensiveness of moral agency and rationality, and 
similarly concludes that, “The extent to which people are actually moved by rational 
considerations, either in their conduct or in their credence, is beyond the purview of 
philosophy. Philosophy can at most tell us what it would be like to be rational.”83  
The puzzling move of grounding the normative in the description of “action” 
while renouncing the relevance of the description of what agents actually do when they 
act is not only a failed theoretical strategy, but also an expression of a curious metaethical 
attitude. How stringent, and how removed from the daily reality our norms are is not 
simply a matter of taste. Moral philosophy does not exist in a vacuum; a theorist cannot 
responsibly provide practical norms without taking an interest in the political, or 
psychological consequences of following them. If it is true, that moral philosophy is, 
essentially, either shaming or guiding. Doing the latter rather than the former depends on 
accepting the nature of the guided subject. This is not done, apparently, by a nod to 
Aristotle’s view of morality as a part of human nature, at least not when “human nature” 
becomes all too Kantian. It is not done by deriving morality from philosophy of agency—
                                                
82 Kant, Kant. 
83 Korsgaard, “Skepticism About Practical Reason,” 25. Emphasis mine. 
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at least not if philosophy of agency is done by someone who already is a moralist. A 
Tortoise, thus, is immune to the sentiment expressed best by John Dewey, who claimed 
“What cannot be understood, cannot be managed intelligently.”84  
When in your ordo amoris struggle is valued higher than mastery, and tough love 
higher than understanding, it is yet another sign that you might be a Tortoise. It is by no 
means an irrational view. From a certain perspective, there is something strangely 
comforting in seeing ourselves as stretched between the right and the mundane. Oliver 
Letwin describes this attitude as “philosophical romanticism”: 
"The hallmark of philosophical romanticism is the belief that the human condition is 
permanently and irredeemably unsatisfactory (...) Like his artistic counterpart, [the 
philosophical romantic] takes the view that we can never be completely at home in 
the world because our "true selves" are, in one way or another, compromised by the 
circumstances of our existence. He insists that our life involves ultimate disjunctions 
— between what we are and what we wish to be, between our feelings and our 
reason, between one aspect of our existence and another"85 
 So far I looked at the strategy of “constitutive normativity” — defining the 
category of action, and using this definition as a normative touchstone for candidate 
behaviors. There is another strategy of that sort: instead of focusing on actions, a tortoise 
can focus on the ‘bearer’ or action, the human being, and from the species-specific 
features derive the normative claims of agency. Fortunately for a Tortoise it seems that 
we are the only ones with a fully functional von Neumann device in our head, with the 
                                                
84 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. xx 
85 Letwin, Oliver (1987). Ethics, Emotion and the Unity of the Self. Croom Helm, New York. 
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little ‘self’ crouching at the output slot. At first this strategy might not look much 
different from the strategies described above. After all, with her construal of Aristotle, 
Korsgaard did assume that agency is constitutive for being a human; her idea of what an 
action is determined both, the understanding of our purpose as creatures and our morality. 
But what was woven into the organic structure of Korsgaard’s more general view can be 
considered separately, as a distinct argument—and one that is far more widespread in the 
philosophical universe.  
 The problem of the relevance of our biological category for understanding agency 
is strongly connected to the problem of the division between human beings and the rest of 
the animal kingdom, and thus tends to stir up a lot of emotion. I will, therefore, illustrate 
this argument in a somewhat unorthodox manner: through the exposition of a strongly 
analogous argument from aesthetics. This will allow me to attend mainly to the very 
structure of the argument, leaving the associated philosophical embroilment aside.  
The argument in question is old and simple. Actions, a tortoise ponders, are done 
by humans. Perhaps, then, the analysis of action could be a natural byproduct of the 
analysis of the property of being a human.  And then—she hopes—we could perhaps 
harvest practical norms not from the essence of action, but from the essence of the 
medium that brings action about. Whatever is human-specific, it would be the very thing 
that should be present when we truly act (of course it would be beyond great if we were 
the only ones with the capacity for rational processing, but let us pretend that this is not 
what is being assumed just yet.) 
A similar tactic was widely used in aesthetics under the name of “medium 
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essentialism;” I will try to summarize it briefly, following the lead of Noel Carroll.86 The 
problem is not that of agential mastery, but that of artistic value. Instead of asking how 
we can adequately tell actions from non-actions, aestheticians ask: how can we 
adequately assess to what extent and whether at all an object is ‘art’?  
Some theorists of cinema87 would say that artistic value is strongly dependent on 
the degree to which a given object exploits medium-specific features; the more film-like 
a film is, therefore, the better it is aesthetically. Carroll describes his years as a graduate 
student of film theory as the time when this way of thinking was never questioned:  
“It seemed self-evident at the time that the best films were the most cinematic, that 
they were the best because they were cinematic, and that if anything were to succeed 
as a film, it would be necessary for it to employ the peculiar features of the so-called 
medium”88 
Certain ‘cinematic’ directors, like Hitchcock, were considered better then those 
that were not (like Bergman). “Sometimes we called these other directors ‘literary,’ says 
Carroll, “It was not a polite way of speaking.”89 Art is, on this view, a predicate earned 
through obeying the nature of a medium.  If we assume, for instance, that the essence of 
film is movement, a film made entirely of stills (like Chris Marker’s La Jetee90) should 
                                                
86 Carroll, Theorizing the Moving Image, Carroll, “The Power of Movies.” 
87 Such as Rudolph Arheim and André Bazin, for instance. I am only referring to the debate about 
film here; medium essentialism argument, however, can be applied to any artistic medium.  
88 Carroll, Theorizing the Moving Image. P. 1 
89 Ibid., 1. 
90 This is an exaggeration, however —“La Jetee” incudes at least two seconds of moving images.  
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impolitely be called “photographic”, and its value as art would be questionable. 
Similarly, the fact that humans might be capable of specific kinds of conduct might 
justify the judging of conduct with respect to the presence of these specific features. This 
view has been first articulated by Thomas Aquinas, for whom the distinctively human 
capacity was the capacity to reason. Since for Aquinas agency was only present in 
voluntary acts,91 he had no problem concluding: “An act is voluntary when it is an 
operation of reason,”92 thus effectively narrowing down the scope of action to acts 
committed by humans. Reasoning that begins with the biologically defined ‘medium’ and 
ends with what makes conduct valuable is, since then, omnipresent. Here is a good 
example of that, just to come back to my favorite tortoise:  
“Moral standards are standards that govern action, so if it is true that only human 
actions have a moral character, and it is true that only human actions are governed 
by reason, it seems plausible that these two properties should be associated. That is, 
there must be something quite distinctive about human action – something that 
makes our actions different from those actions of the other animals – which in turn 
explains why human actions, and those alone, can be both rational and subject to 
moral governance.”93 
Now, medium essentialism is composed of two distinct theses. Just like in the 
constitutive normativity strategy, we have a descriptive claim (for instance, “Unlike other 
                                                
91 See, for instance: Pink, “Reason and Agency.” 
92 Summa Theologiae (1265-74) 1a 2ae q6 al 
93 Korsgaard, “That short but imperious word ought: Human Nature and the Right”. Emphasis 
mine.  
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media, film allows for two-dimensional moving image”) and a normative claim that is 
supposed to follow from it (“Film should exploit movement”). If it worked, we would 
have a great tool for measuring artistic value of films, and a sense of what an ideal film 
would look like (in my extremely simplistic example it would be enough to attach a 
camera to a racing car). “I see you are a film” — I imagine an aesthetician interrogating 
La Jetee — “You must know that, unlike photography or painting, you are capable of 
actually moving your images. Oh, you are not doing that? What do you mean you have 
other merits?? These are things that photography could do.  
Similarly, if unlike animals, we, humans, have the capacity to (insert a faculty, a 
skill or a mental state x), therefore we should strive to (use a faculty, hone a skill, induce 
a mental state x), acting “like a beast” would be an ultimate failure. In an interview, 
Korsgaard once said: “…Everyone who reflects must ultimately come to see her 
humanity itself as an essential and foundational feature of her practical identity.” 94 Thus, 
when she begins her explanation of Kant’s psychology by saying: 
“A non-human animal is conscious […] But we are self-conscious, which means that 
we represent to ourselves not only things in our environment, but our own mental 
states: we think about them”95 
… it comes as no surprise that self-awareness and meta-cognition turn out to be 
essential for agency. Meta cognition, of course, performed as a computation over an 
increased set of data, which now include also symbolic codes of our first-order 
                                                
94 Korsgaard, interview 
95 Korsgaard, “Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self,” October 1, 1998, 50. 
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cognitions.96 “You want to be a good agent” — the interviewer inquires this time around. 
“And yet you have rescued your child from a burning building without even asking 
yourself: shall I do this? Did you even turn on the device in your head? While there might 
be some value in what you have done, keep in mind that a dog could save her pups in this 
manner”.   
Christian natural law theorists and Kantians are by no means the only ones for 
whom the description ‘distinctly human’ is tied with ‘normatively required’. There is a 
part of this argument that seems to be self-evident for nearly everyone involved in 
thinking about action. Consider for instance Harry Frankfurt’s initial opposition to the 
metaethical version of ‘medium essentialism’ as philosophically unsound. Frankfurt 
begins his explanation of the difference between agency and behavior by contrasting a 
freely walking spider with a different spider, whose legs are moved by strings attached to 
them by a mean boy. “Wait, so the first spider is an agent, just like us?”—medium 
essentialist would ask in disdain. Anticipating this, Frankfurt writes: 
“But we must be careful that the ways in which we construe agency and define its 
nature do not conceal a parochial bias, which causes us to neglect the extent to 
                                                
96 Here is a good place to explain why I stuck with personifying the computational metaphor as a 
von Neumann machine, not a Turing machine as such, or a Harvard one. Once we demand that 
deliberation i salso of rules, or happens on a ‘meta-level’, we are, essentially, computing both 
data and instructions. A von Neumann machine can do it, the other ones cannot—it is the only 
model that enables the storage of data and instructions together.  
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which the concept of human action is no more than a special case of another concept 
whose range is much wider”97 
Perhaps, hypothesizes Frankfurt, action is not what remains after subtracting 
lifting one’s paw from lifting another one’s arm; perhaps there is something about both of 
these acts that makes them either an action or a behavior. He thus subscribes to a version 
of causal account of agency, normatively neutral and abhorred by Korsgaard. So far, so 
good, a hare might say—but this very un-tortoise move leaves Frankfurt without the 
possibility of an uncontroversial normative assessment. Thus he fixes it promptly 
developing a view of personhood, which ends up being not much different from 
Bratman’s view on “full-blown agency”. On this view, the admission into the circle of 
creatures that can perform morally relevant actions requires that we are capable of having 
higher-order conative attitudes towards our own desires. It itself, it does not offer an 
opportunity of norm-generating, but it certainly delineates the scope of the application of 
potential norms, should they be developed by someone else. His argument goes like this: 
“Human beings are not alone in having desires and motives, or in making choices. 
They share these things with the members of certain other species […] It seems to be 
peculiarly characteristic of humans, however, that they are able to form what I shall 
call "second-order desires" or "desires of the second order.” 
Frankfurt and others, however, are not mistaken in supposing that there might be a 
difference between humans and other animals, or between any two species, for that 
matter. Take ducks, for example—it is not implausible to think that there is some feature 
                                                
97 Frankfurt, The Problem of Action, p. 162 
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specific to them, and them only; something absent in swans, mosquitos and amoebas. 
Who knows, maybe one day we will identify all the conditions of being a duck, and the 
list will be so good that it will infallibly sort the universe into ducks and non-ducks. 
Maybe human beings have an identifiable essence, and thus there is nothing wrong with 
‘human medium essentialism’ argument?  
There would be nothing wrong with it if the plausibility of this argument relied on 
the assumption that human beings are essentially different than other animals. But in fact 
the validity of this strategy is independent from the question of essences. Sleeping on 
pillows might well be a distinctly human quality, but that would not mean that we should 
measure the degree of agency by the number of pillows in our beds.  As Carroll puts it, 
“Of course, even if the doctrine of medium specificity and the sort of essentialism it 
espouses are false, it still might be the case that cinema has essence.”98  
Let us look at Carroll’s argument once again. There is, it seems, no consensus as 
to what actually constitutes the essence of cinema. But even if there was such agreement, 
the doctrine of medium essentialism still would not be able to offer relevant guidelines. Is 
movement essential to movies? Is it the possibility of editing? Particularly compelling 
mimetic skills? Most likely there will be a rather large set of necessary and sufficient99 
conditions for being classified as a film, including all of the above. Now, if we make the 
normative assessment dependent on the fulfillment of such heterogeneous ‘essence’, we 
                                                
98 Carroll, Theorizing the Moving Image, 15.  
99 Elsewhere, Carroll insists that only necessary conditions can be specified (Carroll, Defining the 
moving image in: Carroll and Choi, Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures. 
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might easily run into trouble. Consider the following problem: which one should be given 
priority if the mimetic function is disrupted by editorial intervention? And, worse, what if 
instead of a set of sufficient conditions there is only a list of necessary ones, and within 
that set some of the conditions are shared with, say, photography?  
Similarly, even if we had a list of cognitive processes that are specific to human 
beings (so far an unlikely empirical achievement, now that elephants have both passed 
the mirror test and used tools, and there was at least one parrot, who seemed to have a 
pretty good grasp on semantics)100, and we decided to treat this list as seriously as 
medium essentialists, we could conceivably run into trouble. The items on the list could 
be, for instance, mutually exclusive with respect to the same time-slice, in either logical 
or physiological sense. It could turn out, for example, that it is specifically human to be 
able to distance oneself from one’s desire and evaluate it before it becomes effective, but 
also to enter, and act under, hypnosis.101 It could be the case, moreover, that the 
conjunction of these two conditions forms one sufficient condition for being a human, but 
each of the conjuncts also belongs to a different set of jointly sufficient conditions (for 
ferrets and for Moomins, respectively). In that situation the ‘essence’, even though 
existent, is useless as a practical recommendation. If we follow the first condition, we are 
no different than ferrets, if we follow the second, we are just like Moomins; the two 
                                                
100 Plotnik, Waal, and Reiss, “Self-recognition in an Asian Elephant.” Pepperberg, Alex & Me.  
101 I am not sure whether the first feature is true only about humans; the second one is definitely 
more widespread than that. I chose this as a hypothetical example because these two states are 
both logically and physiologically exclusive.  
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combined together are impossible to consistently follow. The sheer possibility of this 
situation discredits the entire strategy even without any empirical (or commonsensical for 
that matter) evaluation of the alleged ‘essence’ postulated by various tortoises.  
There is yet another flaw in this strategy, which is best visible through the prism 
of the Darwinian framework. Let me return to Carroll again: he accurately points out that 
different artistic media have not been born out of nowhere, but rather developed as 
extrapolation from another kind of art. Their distinctiveness at a particular moment is 
more a matter of the course of history of artistic employment. The chaotic practice of art 
that takes advantage of the existing tools, including available media, and utilizes it for the 
sake of new manifestations of aesthetic value; this is how ‘progress’ in art can take place. 
To come back to our main problem: perhaps we could gain more as moral beings if we 
spent less time trying to pin down what actions can get a stamp of approval from our 
metaphysical destiny, and more time finding new paths of being better, even if that meant 
exploiting the more ‘beastly’ parts of ourselves. But “…The medium specificity theory 
maximizes purity instead of excellence,”102 claims Carroll, and adds a naturalistic, indeed 
a Darwinian touch to this thought, saying, “…the nature of the medium does not have any 
determinate directive force concerning the way in which that medium is to be 
developed.” And “It is the use we find for the medium that determined what aspect of the 
medium deserves out attention. The medium is open to our purposes; the medium does 
not use us for its own agenda.”103 According to Carroll, art creates its forms non-
                                                
102 Carroll, Theorizing the Moving Image. 15 
103 Ibid., 13. 
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teleologically, and the shapes of these forms are a testimony to the accumulated instances 
of disorganized, free and local searches for artistic deployment of available elements. 
Indeed, it is similarly hard to claim normative relevance of a species-specific ability once 
we assume an evolutionary perspective.  Art forms (features of species) are facts; purpose 
comes from usage—and it is hard to imagine that in the era of Darwinian thinking anyone 
would believe otherwise. But it is also a fact that we find progress to be valuable, even 
once its measurements are recognized as relative and its vector revealed to be aimed 
contingently.  From this point of view, freezing a form by endowing it with a normative 
significance hinders the potential of continuous evolution, whether moral or aesthetic.  
Let me stay for a moment longer with the evolutionary perspective. Say we rid the 
essentialist argument of Aquinas’ natural law component, a theoretical tool that a priori 
identifies the range of possible agents. Now we are left with a species that From the point 
of view of a tortoise,  As one species under God, we did not need to worry about identity; 
as biological beings we must accept the fluidity of evolutionary categorization that is 
inherent in the very concept of species.104 That fluidity, if taken seriously, exposes three 
things. (i) suddenly, essences are exposed as contingent actualities in vast ‘design space’, 
(ii) since evolution creates features by blind optimization from the existing conditions 
and not for the excellence of their prospective function,  there is no saying from 
description alone how should a particular feature be used, (iii) in fact, insisting on 
‘proper’ usage of features might hinder further adaptation. In other words, if we want to 
                                                
104 For a discussion of the fluidity of the concept of species see Dennett (Dennett, Darwin’s 
Dangerous Idea).  
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talk about ourselves as different from animals, thus putting ourselves in the context of 
biological comparison, we might have to say that (i) we are not that different, and 
certainly not necessarily better (at least the standard of comparison must be external to 
the comparison), (ii) no one can tell us we should use opposing thumbs to play piano and 
not videogames unless they already have an independent standard (same with any 
cognitive ability we might contingently have, like reasoning about ends) and (iii) if we 
are allowed to explore a variety of ways of behaving (deliberation, habit, automatic pilot, 
group hypnosis or explorative imagination), we might find out that our moral lives 
become easier / better / more fulfilling (in terms, of course, of some independent 
standard).  
The last argument against medium essentialism that Carroll makes is ad 
personam: he claims that he came to believe that in film studies medium essentialism was 
a defense mechanism the scholars of film developed against the threat of discrediting the 
discipline. As long as there was something unique about film, film scholarship simply 
seemed to be more justified in its existence. There is a similar fear in metaethics, I reckon 
— the special status of human beings at times, and to some, seems like a good 
justification of advancing moral theory, as if any continuity with the animal world 
compromised the foundations of the project. The motivational structure behind placing 
the normative weight on the divide between animals and humans is, however, far more 
complicated. It does a lot of things for a tortoise. It caters to the metaphysical pride that 
still remains in force in the secular world, it consoles the ever-lasting post-Ptolemaic 
sorrow; it cures the existential angst that results from seeing our most cherished abilities 
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as an evolutionary contingency, bringing back the comfort of purposeful metaphysics, 
exchanging back the universe for cosmos, in the same time securing some form of 
conservative political order. But, most of all, it justifies—once again—the search for the 
roots of morality in theory of action. If we relinquish the distinction between us and the 
beasts, and we claim that even the most deliberate arm-raising is essentially similar with 
wagging one’s tail, we would have to look for yet another way to justify moral standards, 
and, frankly, since both, Aquinas’ God and Moore’s good took a leave of absence, we 
might be running out of places.    
* * * 
 A Tortoise, then, is a creature that speaks in a language of old-fashioned 
rationality. Her overt claims are reformed, and yet she relies on the system of semantic 
preferences that can be explained by a tacit acceptance of a generative metaphorical 
structure that can be best explained as a GOFAI machine. But the merger between this 
unmerciful device and the folk-psychological need for a centered and unified agent often 
ends up in implying some kind of operator to the machine, an executor of sorts, who 
needs to fend off all the other annoying parts of the psyche. The self-justifying 
metaphorical GOFAI device helps to satisfy her intuitive need for a steady Archimedean 
point from which we can then lift normativity. But to do that, we must make it logical for 
the little homunculus to tend to the device rather than to other parts of the hierarchical 
mechanism. We should do it, because it is what we do, is one answer; we should do it 
because this is who we are, is another. Both seem to fail to convince anyone who is not 
one of Letwin’s Romantics, or of the Prussian descent.  
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Now consider whether knowledge is a thing you can process in that way without 
having it about you, like a man who has caught some wild birds – pigeons or what 
not – and keeps them in an aviary he has made for them at home. In a sense, of 
course we might say he “has” them all in the time inasmuch as he possesses them, 
mightn’t we? (…) But in another sense he “has” none of them (…) (S)o now let us 
suppose that every mind contains a kind of aviary stocked with birds of every sort, 
some in flocks apart from the rest, some in small groups, and some solitary, flying in 
any direction among them all (…)105 
[Plato, Theaetatus]   
“You must come here for some reason” 
“Well, I——“ Milo began. 
“Come now, if you don’t have a reason, you must at least have an explanation, or 
certainly an excuse,” interrupted the gateman.  
Milo shook his head.  
“Very serious, very serious,” the gateman said, shaking his head also. … “Wait a 
minute, maybe I have an old one you can use” 
 He took a battered suitcase from the gatehouse and began to rummage 
busily through it, mumbling to himself: “No… no… this won’t do… no… h-m-m-
m… ah this is fine,” he cried triumphantly, holding up a small medallion on a chain. 
He dusted it off, and engraved on one side were the words “WHY NOT?” 
 “That’s a good reason for almost anything—a bit used, perhaps, but still 
quite serviceable”  
[Norton Juster, The Phantom Tollbooth] 
                                                
105 Plato, Theaetetus, in: Plato and Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge; the Theaetetus and 
the Sophist of Plato, 197-198a 
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1.  Finding Hares  
I have spent a lot of time talking about Tortoises, and how persistent and ubiquitous their 
species might be. Biologists from Galapagos Islands are undoubtedly surprised at my 
reading—and, in a sense, rightly so.  
 For the paradigm that views action-generation mechanism through the lens of a 
computational metaphor has been bursting at the seams for quite some time now. A lot of 
thinkers expressed their Hare sympathies—the interest in the actual mechanics of agency, 
the acceptance of the possibility of a disorderly architecture of the mind, the willingness 
to give up the possibility of absolute control over one’s own moral destiny through the 
means of impeccable algorithmic processing. Murdoch, whose call against Tortoises 
prompted the first part of this thesis, argued with the prescriptive demands of 
deliberation: 
“This too is why … deliberation at the moment of choice often seems ineffectual. 
We are obscure to ourselves because the world we see already contains our values 
and we may not be aware of the slow delicate processes of imagination and will 
which have put those values there.”106 
 Her conviction that however well oiled the von Neumann machine might be, it 
will likely be useless in the real moments of moral significance was picked up by others. 
Paul Katsafanas, for instance, observes that there is hardly a place in the practical mind 
where the device can work without interferences of some sort, phenomenology of 
deliberation notwithstanding: 
                                                
106 Murdoch Existentialists and Mystics, p. 200 
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“The agent experiences herself as having a reflective distance from the attitude and 
asking herself whether there is a reason to act on it; but, all the while, the attitude 
influences the agent’s reflective thought in ways that she does not grasp.”107  
 These facts about moral decision-making lead some scholars to the idea that the 
Tortoise paradigm must be rejected altogether. Amelie Rorty calls the notion that we are 
presented with extensionally described, discrete courses of actions among which we must 
rationally (‘rationality’ understood in the Good Old Fashioned way) decide, 
“judicialism.” 
“Judicialism is – and is acknowledged to be – radically incomplete. It is incomplete 
as a moral theory because it does not by itself provide a substantive theory of 
virtue… And … it is incomplete as a psychological theory because it does not 
exhaust, nor can it serve as the model for, the many functions of thought in forming 
appropriate actions.”108 
 Others tried to develop an alternative account of what I call, in an attempt to use 
non-committal language, “the stuff that goes on in the head before action happens”. 
Notably, Velleman offered a view on practical reflection that escaped the traps of 
‘judicialism’ by relying on the natural instinct towards intelligibility, best satisfied with 
generated on-the-go, backround narrative-like self-description. He writes about the 
reasons to reject a strict method for practical reasoning: 
“I say that practical reasoning is an experimental discipline. The process of figuring 
out how we can enact intelligible and authentic versions of ourselves cannot be 
                                                
107 Katsafanas, Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency, p. 6 
108 Rorty, 280 
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boiled down to a syllogism. It cannot be formalized in a calculus of “practitions”, 
means and ends, or desires and beliefs. We reason practically, in the long run by 
continually trying out clearer, more coherent and yet more ingenuous ways of being 
and doing; and there is no substitute for trying them out, which is a process of trial 
and error”109  
And, elsewhere, 
 “(The agent) is not guided by a quantitative balance of reasons, anyway: he is guided 
rather by the self-understanding that he gains by bringing to consciousness how he thinks 
and feels about the alternatives”110  
Patricia Churchland is another example of a thinker who strives for some sort of 
Hare revolution—but her coup d’etat relies less on loosening the rules of the inferential 
process of practical reflection, and more on campaigning for a naturalistic input in ethics. 
She sees morality as a matter of negotiation between instincts and institutions, but claims 
that “…the relation between social urges and the social practices that serve well-being is 
not simple, and certainly not syllogistic” 111 Her Hare temperament demonstrates itself in 
her holistic approach to the explanation of practical life, one that she borrows from 
Hume:  
“Hume understood that he needed to have a subtle and sensible account of the 
complex relationship between moral decisions on the one hand and the dynamic 
interaction of mental processes -- motivations, thoughts, emotions, memories, and 
                                                
109 Velleman, How We Get Along, 159. 
110 Ibid., 22. 
111 Churchland, Braintrust, 8. 
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plans -- on the other”112 
Her commitment to treating the analysis of the characteristics of the species as the 
starting point for moral reflection is reminiscent of Dewey’s concern with what 
constitutes sensible morality: 
“Moral principles that exalt themselves by degrading human nature are in fact 
committing suicide. Or else, they involve human nature in unending civil war, and 
treat it as a hopeless mess of contradictory forces”113 
It is not perhaps wrong to say, then, that a strong basis for a Hare theory is out 
there, somewhere between a revival of Dewey, Velleman’s attempts to base practical 
reflection on an instinctual craving for a story and Rorty’s insistence on phronetic 
accounts of virtue. The problem is, I believe, a different one—namely the stiffness of 
metaphorical imagination in the conceptual space stretched between folk-psychological 
frameworks and moral philosophy. It is the lack of the guiding metaphor in the space that 
daily speech and philosophy overlap, the ‘commonsensical’ subset of the habits of a 
reflective mind. If there was a model that was strong enough to permeate the very 
structure of the way we think about ourselves moving in the world, we would be more 
confident as Hares and more easily convinced as Hares’ readers and students. Perhaps the 
key to reorganizing the power structure in metaethical world is to borrow those models 
from philosophy of mind that have already formed around available empirical data, and 
use them as candidate images for the long project of restructuring our action theory, in 
                                                
112 Churchland, Braintrust, 7. Emphasis mine.  
113 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. xx 
  
83 
the name of the more accurate formulation of moral principles in the future.  
For that reason the reminder of this part is devoted to exposition and analysis of 
such modeling practices. Perhaps, one can hope, Dewey’s ingenious conception of habit 
as a bridge between organism’s physiology and citizen’s elaborate practice can be rebuilt 
with the help of recent research in hard sciences, and the symbiotic way in which the 
habits, though separate, formed a whole, evolutionarily successful individuals can be 
explained with reference to a more detailed understanding of biological, moral and 
cultural homeostasis.  
2.  Model ing Plato’s  Aviary—Kurzban,  Dennett ,  Fauconnier  
I have been arguing that, despite considerable developments in moral philosophy as well 
as declarations to the contrary, our thinking of action still bears the imprint of the 
“shopping image”. The moral philosophers of the past used to openly construe the human 
mind in accordance with the principles later described as GOFAI (good old-fashioned 
artificial intelligence),114 which is, on a certain reading at least, simply a fancier way of 
describing the shopping scenario. The pioneers of GOFAI believed that the human mind 
could be recreated if (1) we developed a sufficiently complex code to designate all 
objects (or events) and their relations, (2) created a vast base of individual knowledge 
coded accordingly, (3) used the input device to simulate the stimuli from the 
environment, (4) used some sort of symbol manipulation system to accommodate the 
input and generate the output in the form of proper behavioral responses. A GOFAI 
                                                
114 The term was coined by John Haugeland in Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence. 
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artificial shopper would be, therefore, no different from Murdoch’s shopper: she would 
have a stable base of beliefs and goals, she would be presented on the input with the 
assortment of the particular shop she found herself in, and then, using stable rules of 
symbolic manipulation she would generate the appropriate response in the form of 
choosing the ‘right’ product to get. The two shoppers might differ with respect to the 
ontological status of their conscious mind, which can be relevant to some other aspects of 
this discussion,115 but the important thing is that conscious or not, both shoppers were 
conceived to use the same process to determine the correct action, even if one of them 
was unaware of its own inner happenings.  
 The inadequacy of the GOFAI model, I argued, did not exactly prompt a search 
for a better one, at least insofar as the majority of moral philosophy is concerned; instead, 
it mostly resulted in incremental adjustments. Parts of the ‘knowledge base’ were 
modeled as more difficultly retrievable than others, inputs were limited to reflect the 
partiality of the mind’s awareness of the context, the rules of symbolic manipulation 
became slightly fuzzier. But the model remained, as a useful reference, a regulative ideal 
or a blueprint for analysis. As a tool, it became so deeply ingrained in the realities of 
doing moral philosophy that even small divergences from the GOFAI model (for instance 
Arpaly’s recognition of the messiness of the database) became known as revolutionary 
                                                
115 In particular, some dualistically minded theorists might claim that the GOFAI shopper, even 
though seeming no different than the original one, is not, in fact, conscious or in possession of 
any mind at all. For the discussion of this problem see Chalmers, The Conscious Mind and 
Dennett’s response to Chalmers (Dennett, The Zombic Hunch in: Dennett, Brainchildren.) 
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approaches.  
 But, it seems, there are alternative models available, born on the borders between 
disciplines such as psychology, philosophy of mind and neuroscience. They appear to be 
more empirically adequate, more reliably predictive, more effectively explanatory; they 
just do not seem to inspire metaethical mainstream enough to become visible in the daily 
life of moral philosophy. Let us look at them in more detail, and, if they deliver, become 
their advocates, so they can (perhaps) one day be championed by Richard Rorty’s ‘poets’, 
and enter the deeper structures that govern the ways of thinking.  
We can begin, in fact, long time ago. In the famous passage of Theaetetus, Plato 
sketches a metaphorical model of how the human mind works: 
Now consider whether knowledge is a thing you can process in that way without 
having it about you, like a man who has caught some wild birds – pigeons or what 
not – and keeps them in an aviary he has made for them at home. In a sense, of 
course we might say he “has” them all in the time inasmuch as he possesses them, 
mightn’t we? (…) But in another sense he “has” none of them (…) (S)o now let us 
suppose that every mind contains a kind of aviary stocked with birds of every sort, 
some in flocks apart from the rest, some in small groups, and some solitary, flying in 
any direction among them all (…)116 
Plato’s image of the disorderly aviary, where thoughts and memories (birds) are 
presented as semi-independent agents, engaged in constant movement and ever-changing 
relationship with other thoughts, turns out to be in striking agreement with the presently 
                                                
116 Plato, Theaetetus, in: Plato and Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge; the Theaetetus and 
the Sophist of Plato, 197-198a 
  
86 
reliable results of the neuroscientific research.  
Robert Kurzban, for instance, has championed a specific perspective on the way 
we work as acting and reacting agents that is based on a similar intuition: that the 
mechanism behind our cognitive affairs result from a number of different, not always 
interdependent processes. This conception of the mind is called modularity117 and has 
been first put forth by Fodor,118 but considerably refined afterwards. To explain his 
                                                
117 Modularity is often contrasted with the connectionist model, where all functions emerge via a 
unified process of learning from a homogenous structure or with the computational model, which 
is a kind of GOFAI. Some authors believe that a commitment to modularity is mutually exclusive 
with the idea plasticity of the brain (Ramachandran and Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain). See 
Barrett and Kurzban, “Modularity in Cognition.” for the discussion on why it is not the case. 
Modularity does not necessarily presume anatomical basis for each of the modular processes, 
unless one understands modularity the way Jerry Fodor did (see the next footnote).  
118 Fodor, The Modularity of Mind. Fodor’s understanding of the modularity hypothesis, however, 
has been very narrow—he suggested, for instance, that only ‘peripheral’ systems of the cognitive 
machinery (like vision or hearing) are modular; he also claimed that the concept of modularity 
must be connected to nativism, and that modules work necessarily in an automated manner. He 
himself later criticized his efforts to explain the working of the mind through his view of 
modularity in Fodor, The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way. Fodor’s problem with extending the 
notion of modularity was mainly his idea that ‘abductive inference’, a prominent sort of our 
cognitive activity concerned with choosing ‘the best explanation’ for witnessed phenomena, 
cannot be (he claimed) conceived in modular terms, as it must engage and process the totality of 
information indiscriminately. See Barrett and Kurzban, “Modularity in Cognition” and Kurzban 
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model, Kurzban uses a quote from an unpublished draft of Minsky’s Society of the 
Mind,119 where Minsky paints an image that bears some strong resemblance to Plato’s 
aviary metaphor: 
“The mind is a community of “agents”. Each has limited powers and can 
communicate only with certain others. The powers of mind emerge from their 
interactions for none of the Agents, by itself, has significant intelligence […] Some 
of them bear useful knowledge, some of them bear strategies for dealing with other 
agents, some of them carry warnings or encouragements about how the work of 
others is proceeding. And some of them are concerned with discipline, prohibiting or 
“censoring” others from thinking forbidden thoughts. 
Modularity, as endorsed by Kurzban, not only assumes that mental phenomena 
arise from the operation of multiple distinct processes rather than a single 
undifferentiated one; it also claims that the operation of various modules is all there is—
in other words, that no one is in charge of coordinating the synchronous operations of the 
modules, no one switches appropriate modules on and off when necessary, no one 
controls the parallel systems from a meta-level. How do we, then, perform any action at 
all, if even the simple movement of one’s arm arises from the workings of a number of 
distinct processes, often oblivious of one another? Kurzban answers this question in the 
following way: 
“[…] it might seem that the dynamic activation and deactivation of modules is 
                                                                                                                                            
and Aktipis, “Modularity and the Social Mind Are Psychologists Too Self-ish? for a refutation of 
this claim.  
119 Minsky, Society Of Mind. 
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complicated, influenced by one’s age, current state, current context and so on. How 
is this symphony of modules coordinated? The short answer is that I don’t know, 
and I don’t think anyone knows, and that the answer is that there’s no one answer, 
but that, yes, it’s all very interesting.”120 
A module, then, is a sub-process of information processing that might, or might 
not, affect your action or mental state in a given moment.121 Emotions, for instance, can 
be understood as a particular interaction between certain modules: “You see a bear and 
your modules designed for foraging, mating and pretty much everything else get shut off, 
and your modules for evasion turn on. “Fear” then, is this process, the suite of reactions 
that lead to some modules gaining priority over others given the current context.”122  
Why would we want to model the mind in a modular way? First, modularity 
accounts much better for the empirical phenomena than a connectionist view, or any 
GOFAI type of framework, no matter how complex and self-referential. Second, it offers 
                                                
120 Kurzban, Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite, 67. 
121  It is, of course, a fairly vague definition. The following quote might help, though. In 
opposition to Fodor, who tried to specify the necessary conditions for a process to be considered a 
module, Barrett and Kurzban write: “What it [a modular structure] will look like in a given 
case—for example, whether or not it will entail automaticity or encapsulation—depends on the 
details of the mechanism in question. In short, we agree with Pinker, who argued that modules 
should be defined by the specific operations they perform on the information they receive, rather 
than by a list of necessary and sufficient features.” (Barrett and Kurzban, “Modularity in 
Cognition,” 628.) 
122 Kurzban, Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite, 67., p. 67 
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explanations of certain common human behaviors that are more efficient and satisfying 
than any of the opposing models. And third, it is our only way to escape the (already 
crippled but still persistent) homunculus, who creeps back into all those models of the 
mind that assume homogeneity of, or strong interconnectedness across, cognitive 
processing.  
Let me start with the first reason—the empirical adequacy of the modular model, 
and briefly refer to the facts that were traditionally troublesome to non-modular views of 
the mind. Patients with ‘split brains’, whose corpus callosum has been partially, or fully 
severed123 often manifest a curious symptom: they are unable to name (or report the 
presence of) an object shown on the left side of their visual field. When presented with 
two images in separate visual fields, such as a chicken leg on the right and a pile of snow 
on the left, they report seeing only the chicken leg.124 Now, when asked to point at a 
picture that is related to the viewed image, patients pointed at a picture of a chicken with 
their right hand (correctly pairing it with the chicken leg image), but their left hand 
always pointed to an image of a snow shovel. They must have seen it somehow, it seems. 
Curiously, when interrogated about pointing at the snow shovel, they would develop a 
reason wholly independent of the snow scene input (for instance “I saw a claw and I 
                                                
123 Most often corpus callosum is cut in the last-ditch attempt to help patients with severe cases of 
epilepsy.  
124 These experiments were first conducted by Gazzaniga, LeDoux and Wilson; see: LeDoux, 
Wilson, and Gazzaniga, “A Divided Mind”; Gazzaniga, LeDoux, and Wilson, “Language, Praxis, 
and the Right Hemisphere”; Gazzaniga, “Brain Mechanisms and Conscious Experience.” 
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picked the chicken, and you have to clean out the chicken shed with a shovel.") The most 
striking thing about the response of this sort, as Gazzaniga and Le Doux, the lead authors 
of these experiments, report, was not the fact that it occurred, but the patient’s absolute 
confidence in his125 explanation. For Gazzaniga, this was a sufficient ‘architectural’ 
evidence that human mind is modular: he concluded that speech (in his view the 
cornerstone to the conscious experience), verbal reasoning and vision were ‘running’ 
separately, and communicated only through the thin fibers of the corpus callosum.126 
Both Gazzaniga and Le Doux concluded that corpus callosotomy simply revealed one of 
the mechanism of the permanent mechanism of rationalizing confabulation that ‘whole-
brain’ patients also exhibit, namely the ‘convenient’ separation of informational input 
from the ‘inner narrator’.  
Kurzban analyzes countless other experiments where people with their brains 
intact, behave in a fashion similar to those after brain bisection. The blind spot 
experiments,127 the rationalizations of the post-hypnotic suggestions128 or other instances 
                                                
125 I am using the pronoun ‘his’ because this particular response was given by a 15 years old male 
patient, referred to as ‘P. S.’ 
126 Gazzaniga, “Brain Modularity.” Perhaps it is important to say that researchers like Gazzaniga, 
Le Doux or Ramachandran treat brain dysfunction not as a distinct phenomenon, the sole focus of 
their studies; rather, they treat it as a window into the workings of the more standard brains.  
127 Where people are presented a stimulus in their blind spot, and respond to it unknowingly, 
subsequently rationalizing their response (see Ramachandran and Blakeslee, Phantoms in the 
Brain) 
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of our inability to discern what stimuli have caused our reactions129 all suggest that 
information that certainly enters the system might not be accessible to subsets of that 
system: one module processes it, hides it from another, but its behavior, modified by this 
information, functions as an input to the other module (such as decision-making module). 
Kurzban references the research of Nisbett and Wilson, who conclude that there is a 
massive evidence that “…there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher 
order cognitive processes”130—a claim that supports the modularity thesis.  
The second reason to adopt the modular model of the mind lies in its ability to 
provide satisfying explanations to the phenomena that have otherwise been 
philosophically troublesome. Consider, for instance, the problem of self-deception and 
the related problem of akrasia. They have been at the center of attention in moral 
philosophy not just because they might be morally suspect, but also because they were 
(and still are) hard to fit into the GOFAI models of the mind, even with liberal ‘Freudian’ 
adjustments. More often than ‘How blameworthy is an akratos?” we pondered the 
question, “How is the weakness of the will possible”. How does modularity help the case 
here?  
The main feature of the modularity view is the postulated lack of a ‘module’ that 
can claim absolute informational access: “A key point is that any given specialized 
                                                                                                                                            
128 For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Daniel M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will. 
129 For a number of experiments of this sort see Ariely, The Upside of Irrationality; Ariely, The 
(Honest) Truth About Dishonesty. 
130 Nisbett, Wilson, “Telling More Than We Can Know,” p. 231 
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computational mechanism—any module—might or might not be connected up to any 
other module.”131 This insight is the origin of the idea of ‘informational encapsulation’—
the claim that “…your brain can represent mutually inconsistent things at the same 
time.”132 Not only it can represent contradictory things, but it might, in fact, be bound to 
do so—for evolutionary reasons. Kurzban says, “Not only some modules work better 
when they have less information, some might work better when they have wrong 
information,”133 and calls the tendency to ignore certain kinds of information in the 
process of forming specific self-related beliefs the tendency to be ‘strategically wrong’. 
What is ‘strategic’ about certain ways of being wrong? 
Taylor and Brown coined the term ‘positive illusions’ to describe the kinds of 
judgment tendencies that habitually overestimate the self-value, the value of one’s 
possessions or one’s relatives. Positive illusions are ubiquitous. It is, I venture a wild 
guess, probably impossible that 94% of college professors are ‘above average’ as 
instructors, but this is how many of them rate themselves as such;134 it is equally 
impossible that a quarter of all SAT takers are in top 1% in terms of their people skills, 
and yet this is how many of them think that they are.135 People skills or teaching 
                                                
131 Kurzban, Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite, 42. 
132 Ibid., 43. 
133 Ibid., 44. 
134 Cross, “Not Can, But Will College Teaching Be Improved?”. 
135 This, and other research on this phenomenon begun with the seminal paper by Shelley Taylor 
and Jonathan Brown (Taylor and Brown, “Illusion and Well-being.”). The more recent treatment 
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effectiveness are, to be fair, somewhat difficult to judge objectively; we can, however, 
trust that people know their own faces fairly well—after all they see themselves in the 
mirror almost every day. One of the funniest ‘positive illusions’ experiments studied the 
skill of recognizing one’s own face. Subjects were shown three or more pictures of 
themselves, one of them ‘raw’ (developed without prior Photoshop treatment), all others 
airbrushed to make them more wrinkle-free and generally more appealing. Most subjects 
did not identify the ‘raw’ picture of themselves, pointing to one of the airbrushed 
versions instead.136 Somehow, during the exercise, the knowledge of how they looked 
was switched off, and the optimistic self-image took over. 
Phenomena such as positive illusions—the tendency to see ourselves as smarter, 
prettier, younger137 and more socially apt than we actually are, or the optimism of 
terminal cancer patients are far too common to brush them off as cognitive failures. 
Taylor and Brown hinted at a fairly high correlation between the strength and scope of 
                                                                                                                                            
of this topic can be found in Taylor and Brown, “Positive Illusions and Well-being Revisited.” 
136 Taylor and Brown, “Illusion and Well-being.” 
137 Taylor and Brown’s bold conclusions regarding the advantageousness of positive illusions of 
were recently confirmed in a study that looked at the ‘illusion of youth’ in older people. Retirees 
who harbored an over-exaggerated youthful bias (of more than 15 years) were far more satisfied 
with their leisure time, had higher self-esteem, felt better health-wise, and were less easily bored 
than those who felt as old as they were or who, except for perceived health, manifested only a 
moderate youthful bias (Gana, Alaphilippe, and Bailly, “Positive Illusions and Mental and 
Physical Health in Later Life.”) 
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positive illusions and one’s general well-being.138 Kurzban takes it one step further and 
claims that the bundle of modules that take care of our social life can do their job 
significantly better when we have skewed, or even wrong information about our mating 
value or survival prospects.139 After all, our self-confidence might convince someone 
about our value as mates, and our own steadfast belief in the possibility of survival, even 
in the face of terminal disease, might safeguard us from being mistreated by those, who 
would otherwise not have to fear future retaliation. Thus “…some systems might be 
engineered specifically not to get information from (or send information to) other 
modules.”140  
In this context, Kurzban mentions a text “…dramatically called ‘On the very 
possibility of self deception’,” where the author (not mentioned) discusses two 
subsystems, which he denotes S1 and S2, in the brain of a person. The question the 
                                                
138 Similar conclusions were recently drawn by a group of researchers at the university of 
Belgrade regarding ‘positive illusions’ about the past. Apparently the strength of the tendency to 
skew the narrative history in one’s favor (by creating false memories or remodeling true ones) is a 
fairly good predictor of how adjusted and successful a particular individual is (Žeželj et al., “The 
Impact of Ego-involvement in the Creation of False Childhood Memories.”) 
139 This is perhaps the biggest difference between Kurzban’s view of the mind and that of Fodor, 
even though they both have championed the modularity thesis. Fodor believes that the most 
important function of the mind is the ‘fixation of true beliefs’ (Fodor, The Mind Doesn’t Work 
That Way.) Kurzban believes that the mind want to fixate evolutionarily helpful beliefs, that those 
just quite often happen to be the true ones—but not as often as one would normally assume.   
140 Kurzban, Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite, 44. 
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author asks is this: what if S1 believes one thing, but S2 believes another? “This can’t 
possibly be,” Kurzban quotes the author, “Because the person cannot, of course, be both 
S1 and S2.” Kurzban finds it to be an amuzing statement: “I love this,” he writes, 
“especially the “of course”.141  
Perhaps, then, our ‘social’ module is designed to sometimes ignore our ‘data 
collection’ modules, or, in sufficiently socially salient contexts simply overrides them, 
switches them off the way fear of a roaring grizzly bear shuts off our aesthetic 
appreciation systems. Either possibility explains pretty well (although does not 
necessarily justify) the structure of some instances of self-deception. Similarly, an 
akratos can be viewed not as a mysterious creature whose beliefs have dubious epistemic 
status, but as a bundle of operating processes that might well be independent from one 
another, thus often producing surprising action results. Rather than a problem for theory 
of action, akrasia becomes a fortunate insight into the mechanics of aagency. When we 
give up the idea of the cognitive center that controls and reviews all reasoning processes, 
and replace it with a model of parallel processing systems connected by communication 
channels the width of which is evolutionarily designed and that can open or shut 
depending on contexts, the explanatory trouble is over.  Kurzban frequently references 
the fascinating work of Breitenburg and his studies on ‘vehicles.’142 Vehicles are very 
simple electronic devices that are equipped with a few simple sensors (such as light or 
heat sensor), which are wired to the motion mechanism in a way that makes the vehicle 
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either ‘pursue’ or ‘avoid’ (usually with a set degree of sensitivity) a particular stimulus. 
Breitenburg’s strikingly simple vehicles exhibit strikingly complex behaviors, especially 
in situations that make them, so to speak, torn inside. When a vehicle is designed to avoid 
light and pursue heat, but heat happens to be available only in a well-lit spot, it might, in 
turns, approach the spot and run away; a simple change in wiring that adjusts the strength 
of the vehicle’s response might make it remain still half-way towards the source of heat 
and light, or, if, say, the heat sensor is adjusted to a lower sensitivity, very slowly leave 
the lit place. The simple system of informational input, such as the heat sensor, together 
with its connection to the vehicle’s wheels is precisely what Kurzban would call ‘a 
module’—a separate process, with encapsulated information and independent 
operations—but functioning alongside the light-avoidance module in a somewhat 
symbiotic manner. To an external observer, the vehicle’s behavior seems organic and 
holistic, with clearly identifiable likes and dislikes; the in-principle isolatability of the 
two modules does not result in any reason to abandon an intentional stance towards the 
device. An akratos is fairly well explained (but then again, not necessarily justified) as 
analogous to Breitenburg’s vehicle: pulled in two distinct directions by two separate 
systems; the net force of their respective persistence determines, in a hardly mysterious 
fashion, the outcome of her action. The main difference is that an akratos is not made of 
two, but countless subsystems of this sort, and their interactions with the environing 
forces and one another are far more complex.  
The third reason to adopt the modularity view is its unique ability143 to generate 
                                                
143 An ability that is shares, perhaps, with an old-fashioned determinism, but not with any of the 
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language that does not invite the sort of metaphorical imagery that became known as the 
‘Cartesian theatre’. Cartesian theatre happens when the special center in the brain (which 
could be conceptualized as the functional area of the stably conscious, anatomically, as 
the ‘true’ self, the soul or, metaphorically, as the little man at the control panel) is 
presented the contents of the mental experiences for consideration. Kurzban is weary of 
the pitfalls of this dualistic view 144  and warns somewhat dramatically, “Without 
modularity, dualism creeps in.”145  
A knee-jerk reaction of a philosopher to this worry could be to order him to calm 
down – after all there are reasons to believe that we have successfully ridden philosophy 
of the homuncular myth. Already James noticed that, “There is no cell or group of cells in 
the brain of such anatomical or functional preeminence as to appear to be the keystone or 
center of gravity of the whole system.”146 But Kurzban is not alone in his worry that most 
psychology and philosophy of the mind still keeps implying a homuncular view, even if 
only as an element of the metaphorical furniture of the particular frameworks. In 
Consciousness Explained, Dennett expresses the same concern:   
                                                                                                                                            
connectionist or GOFAI theories.  
144 Even if the ‘special center’ were understood anatomically, not in terms of a ‘sould’ of sorts, it 
would still invite a kind of dualism: the passive, perceiving ‘flesh’ of the bodily and mental chaos 
has to be animated by the active meta-agent.  
145 Kurzban, Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite, 76. 
146 James, The Principles of Psychology. 
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“Many theorists would insist that they have explicitly rejected such an obviously bad 
idea. But as we shall see, the persuasive imagery of the Cartesian Theater keeps 
coming back to haunt us – laypeople and scientists alike – even after its ghostly 
dualism has been denounced and exorcised. […] The idea of special center in the 
brain is the most tenacious bad idea bedeviling our attempts to think about 
consciousness. […] it keeps reasserting itself, in new guises, and for a variety of 
ostensibly compelling reasons.”147 
 How does the homunculus survive in even in what seem to be the most 
materialistic accounts out there? By locking the control room, throwing the key out, and 
committing a quiet yet well-publicized suicide—but, in an act of retaliation, leaving the 
system of corridors leading up to the room intact. The new explanations travel through 
the old hallways and pass by the locked doors, wistfully glancing at the sealed entrance, 
realizing that the entire system would make more sense if it reopened. The system of 
corridors represents what is projected by the structure of the metaphors we use to speak 
of the affairs in the mind, which has not changed, despite the absence of what has been 
tying them together. In presenting dilemmas in moral philosophy we imply the existence 
of the space within which the said dilemma can be surveyed and solved. In speaking of 
self-deception, we imply that ‘on some level’ the agent ‘does know A,’ but chooses to be 
blinded with B instead. Notice that any kind of talk that strongly problematizes the 
possibility of inconsistent responses is at the danger of being  ‘homuncular’ in this sense, 
simply because the very idea of the possibility of unity prompts the thought of a 
‘unifying’ mechanism, a centralized point of view that has all the necessary informational 
access. This pitfall is elegantly avoided by the modular perspective: “To the extent that 
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the mind does consist of separate modules, there is just no reason to talk about what one 
module believes as being more genuine or real than another one,” says Kurzban, and adds 
that “The next time you hear a psychologist try to talk about what someone “really” 
believes, you should really not believe the psychologist”148 
 
 At this point we can safely assume that there is at least a strong possibility that the 
modular view models the mind in a way that is encouragingly empirically adequate, more 
effectively explanatory than the ‘holistic’ models and safe from the old ghosts typically 
blamed on Descartes. However, even if the modular view gives us a fairly smooth 
explanation of the mechanics of conduct, including some instances of morally puzzling 
conduct such as self-deception and akrasia, we are still without a framework that would 
allow for the actual insight into the processes of moral thinking. For even if an akratos is 
like Breitenburg’s vehicle, pulled into two different directions by broadly defined 
modules and ending up following the one that has been evolutionarily favored to take 
over in this particular type of context, the vehicle herself can justifiably protest that this 
explanation fails to touch upon her driving experience. A model that would not fail to do 
so does not have to (and should not) mimic the way the driving feels to the agent—an 
exercise in successful narration about the phenomenological self has little to do with 
more scientific self-understanding. It makes sense, after all, that evolution could have 
made us prefer certain things, or do certain things without giving us a knowing access 
into the actual reasons why we prefer or do things in particular fashion, let alone the 
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mechanics behind the thinking or the doing—for evolution ‘cares’ only that we do these 
beneficial things, and not about values such as transparency or self-knowledge. What the 
modular model, in its broad perspective, lacks, is a more detailed view on the mechanics 
of the self-phenomenology of a (modular) moral agent and her struggle. Even in a 
strongly materialistic perspective, there must be a place to explain the ways things seem 
to us, when we are trying to drive our modular vehicles.  
 But how to provide that explanation without giving in to the intuitions that 
underlie, structure and control the way the things seem to us? Certainly the ‘shopping’ 
view of the mechanics of thought in action does not manage to do that. As I argued 
previously, even the modified versions of it still work from the template of a self-
transparent, centered, unified and computationally capable mind (that just sometimes, 
sadly, happens to be a little less transparent, less unified or less computationally capable). 
I argued that the work on decision-making in social psychology and economics (by 
researchers such as Gigerenzer149 or Tversky and Kahnemann150) requires us not to 
piecemeal engineer our model of thinking, but find an entirely new one. The closest to 
such empirically accurate, phenomenologically plausible, homunculus-free and 
modularity-friendly model is one that emerges from the development of the concept of 
                                                
149  Bouissac and Gigerenzer, “Bounded Rationality”; Gigerenzer and McElreath, “Social 
Intelligence in Games”; Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking. 
150  Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty”; Tversky and Kahneman, “The 
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.” For a summary of their main points see, 
Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow. 
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mental spaces by Fauconnier,151 Dennett’s analysis of consciousness that results in his 
‘multiple drafts’ idea152 and his more recent JITSA model that he developed, drawing on 
Fauconnier’s conception, with Hurley and Adams.153  
 Dennett’s multiple drafts model of consciousness starts with the intuition that 
‘Consciousness is gappy and sparse, and doesn’t contain half of what people think is 
there.”154 Consider experiences of being aware of something only post-factum, such as 
suddenly realizing you have just passed a relative on the street. We can count the chimes 
of a clock after they stop, without being aware of even hearing it at the time when the 
sounds were happening. We can recall details of images that have not entered our 
awareness at the time of viewing. Like cartoon characters, stepping of a cliff as if the 
road went on, we often keep walking on air until a sudden awareness of an already 
‘expired’ stimulus hits us, and then only we fall. On the ‘Cartesian theatre’ account, these 
are pretty easy to explain: our ‘consciousness center’ was shown perceptions, including 
the perception of the sounds of the clock or all the details of the viewed images. The 
operational center decided on the relevance of allowing these particular stimuli further, 
into the conscious awareness. The homunculus was shown that the road ends at the edge 
of the cliff, so when further happenings required the revision of the previous screening 
process, the discarded stimulus was reconsidered by the audience of the Theatre.  
                                                
151 Fauconnier, Mental Spaces. 
152 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1992. 
153 Hurley, Dennett, and Adams, Inside Jokes. 
154 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1992, 366. 
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 What happens, however, when the missing stimulus was never presented in the 
theatre in the first place? In strikingly simple experiments with visual stimuli arranged 
around the ‘blind spot’ in our vision, we can observe two disconnected parts of a line 
merging, across the blind spot, into a continuous figure, stretched through an area where 
it is physically impossible for us to see.155 Children often approach game booths and grab 
the joystick to ‘play’, without even noticing that they have no control over the game at 
all, because they failed to put the coin in. When adults are put in situations like this, they 
generate the illusion of causality with equal ease.156 In the well-known ‘color phi’ 
experiment, subjects are shown a blue dot on the left side of the screen and then, after a 
short period of blank, white screen, a red dot appears on the right side; the subjects are 
convinced not only that the dot has moved from the left to the right, but also that it has 
changed the color to red mid-way.157 The question that emerges in studies such as that of 
the ‘color phi’ is how exactly consciousness is able to create a perception that includes 
the future information (the change of color from blue to red) before it even happens? Are 
we to say, asks, among others, Goodman,158 that the brain is clairvoyant, or should we 
say that the final perceptions are ‘constructed”?  
 Dennett’s response to Goodman’s question is that he has constructed a false 
                                                
155  For instructions on doing it yourself, see Ramachandran, A Brief Tour of Human 
Consciousness. 
156 Wegner and Wheatley, “Apparent Mental Causation.” 
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dilemma. People like Goodman, claims Dennett, are tacitly committed to the Cartesian 
idea: they require that we solve this puzzle by postulating some sort of editing 
mechanism performed for the benefit of the ‘controller’ or the ‘conscious self’—either a 
Stalinesque, or Orwellian one. The Stalinesque editing would happen before the 
perception is allowed on the stage: “In the brain’s editing room, located before 
consciousness, there is a delay, a loop of slack like the tape delay used in broadcasts of 
“live” programs, which gives the censors in the control room a few seconds to bleep out 
obscenities before broadcasting the signal”159 The Orwellian mechanism, on the other 
hand, is a revisionist one: the audience in the theatre sees the perceptions the way they 
are, but is then promptly offered an alternative version of the recent perceptual history—
which, like a nation exhausted with an authoritarian regime, it gladly accepts, forgetting 
the truth right away.  
 Dennett notes that that there is a reason to reject both, the Stalinesque and the 
Orwellian explanation. First, both of them can account for all the data regarding ‘revised’ 
perceptions like color phi, not only the existing set of data, but all the future ones we can 
ever imagine getting, too. And second, speaking of cognition as if it was a process done 
for the benefit of someone—the audience, the self, the conscious center of cognitive 
gravity, or consciousness as such—invites the homuncular view back: “What Goodman 
overlooks is the possibility that the brain doesn’t actually have to go to the trouble of 
“filling in” anything with “construction” – for no one is looking”.160  
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 The alternative is to assume that there are ‘multiple drafts’ of data interpretation 
being created by the brain simultaneously; one of them ‘wins’ and hence modulates 
subsequent behavior. How does it ‘win’, however? What is the mechanism of choosing 
one of the drafts as the guiding one for conduct? Why is one of the drafts ‘probed’ by 
consciousness, and the other ones are discarded? The answer Dennett gives is somewhat 
similar to Kurzban’s reply to the question about the synchronization of the various 
modules: it is hard to say. The feedback from the environment might create a habit of 
more frequent emergence of a certain kinds of drafts, but generally speaking all this stuff 
in the brain is a bit of a Pandemonium. When trying to describe how speech is generated, 
he also imagines multiple drafts of possible reactions being activated and entering some 
sort of ‘fight’—just like the drafts of perception interpretations do: 
In the Pandemonium model, control is usurped rather than delegated, in a process 
that is largely undesigned and opportunistic; there are multiple sources for the 
design “decisions” that yield the final utterance, and no strict division is possible 
between the marching orders of content flowing from within and the volunteered 
suggestions for implementation posed by the word-demons. What this brand of 
model suggests is that in order to preserve the creative role of the thought-expresser 
(something that mattered a good deal to Otto [a skeptical character invented by 
Dennett]), we have to abandon the idea that the thought-thinker begins with a 
determinate thought to be expressed. This idea of determinate content also mattered 
a good deal to Otto, but something has to give.161 
 In other words, our conscious life looks less like this: 
“I should probably save this man from the coming bus. But should I? It would be 
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morally good, I guess, but what about that meeting I’m going to? Eh, my duty 
matters more to me than my career, I think. I’ll just grab him, there I go… Hey 
you!” 
And more like this: 
“Beeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeep. . . . 
Yabba-dabba-doo-fiddledy-dee-tiddly-pom-fi-fi-fo-fum. . . . 
And so, how about that?, baseball, don’t you know, in point of fact, strawberries, 
happenstance, okay? That’s the ticket. Well, then. . . . 
I’m going to knock your teeth down your throat! 
You big meany! 
Ready any good books lately? 
Your feet are too big!”162 
Dennett’s multiple drafts model is, therefore, not only presenting consciousness as 
less capacious, continuous and orderly than we are used to—it also takes agential control 
away from it, showing that the quality of being conscious is imparted onto particular 
brain processes or data largely randomly, in a way that is underdesigned and mostly 
habit-formed. He goes as far as to suggest that despite its momentous consequences in 
terms of communicational and learning abilities, consciousness as we understand is not 
an innate function of the brain, but a hack of the brain, “…largely a product of cultural 
evolution that gets imparted to brains in early training”163 created through habits that 
“…would be entrained by frequently saying to a novice, “Tell me what you are doing,” 
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and “Tell me why you are doing that,”164 until a novice gets into the habit of addressing 
the same requests to himself.165 
We have, therefore, Kurzban’s modular view of the mechanisms that make us roll 
that explains the contradictory and de-centered ways in which we act. Stretched across a 
subset of these modules we have the sparse and ‘gappy’ quality of consciousness as 
described by Dennett’s multiple drafts conception. This sort of model gives us a good 
explanatory access to the way we process information, and does not in any way assume 
that somewhere inside the homeostatic Pandemonium a von Neumann machine is hidden. 
But the GOFAI model gave an account of the subset of information processing, with 
detailed accounts of how it could go. Can we have a similar account for a mind that is not 
a von Neumann machine, but an unstable aviary? 
The JITSA model is an attempt to describe the ways our thinking works in a way 
that would fit into and specify the underspecified modular framework. It aims at 
connecting the description of the neural mechanisms behind cognitive processing to the 
phenomenological experience of thinking, pondering and judging.  
What drives most of the Hare ways of modeling the mind is the powerful intuition 
that our brains seem to have a problem with handling a lot of information at once. How is 
the brain to do a good job of perception processing or memory search without either 
lapsing into a combinatorial explosion or failing to represent important information? 
                                                
164 Ibid., 220. 
165 This particular example only addresses the part of consciousness that concerns the self-
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There must be, a hare thinks, a fairly well-developed automatic way of discarding the 
potentially irrelevant data. Such automatic ways—among which the most described so far 
were heuristics and biases—are, of course, bound to once in a while miss something 
important,166 but the truth is that, whatever they are, they have been certainly doing a 
passable job at moving our lives forward.  
The JITSA model describes how the brain performs the cognitive tasks it faces 
without short-circuiting or overheating from the computational process. JIT—just in 
time—is a term borrowed from software engineering, and refers to program design such 
that it performs computation only in the moment it needs to be performed; never ahead of 
time. ‘SA’ refers to spreading activation across the brain structure. For the authors of the 
conception, the tool that takes care of balancing the relevance of considered data against 
the overload is the “…on-demand creation of mental spaces via the process of spreading 
activation.”167 
                                                
166 Some thinkers, like Gigerenzer, still praise the ingenuity of these mechanisms, and claim that 
heuristics and biases are, given the energy constraints and computational limitations, a much 
better tool for decision making than Bayesian computation. Hence his insistence on the 
development of further heuristic tools of decision making. Others, like Kahnemann, find the 
existence of such mechanisms to be a sad evidence that we are not as rational as we would like to 
be; the positive program resulting from such attitude is a call for better self-control and less 
reliance on thin-slicing and other processes of that sort. 
167 Hurley, Dennett, and Adams, Inside Jokes, 97. 
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What is a mental space? The authors, following Fauconnier,168 describe it as “ a 
region of working memory where activated concepts and percepts are semantically 
connected into a holistic situational comprehension model”169 This definition sounds 
vaguely familiar to anyone acquainted with some of the most important social and 
cognitive theories of the our time.  Gestalt psychology,170 for instance, suggested that 
images and situations are perceived holistically, through a process largely controlled by 
expectations, without the unprompted awareness of details. Erving Goffman’s 
perspective on social interaction described it as the application of appropriate cultural 
‘scripts’ (which can be understood also as semantic wholes awaiting application in long-
term memory) in a mutual effort to organize and understand social life and one’s role in 
it.171 Goffman’s script contains the necessary elements of the furniture of a social 
institution—e.g. the ‘restaurant’ script will guide us through the comprehension and 
behavior during a dinner at ‘Applebee’s’. Goffman’s understanding of cognitive 
‘frames’172 as the structures that determine the interpretation of events changed sociology 
forever: it prompted the development of theories such as ethnomethodology,173 concerned 
with unearthing and describing the hidden frames and scenarios we harbor and apply in 
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the processing of socially-mediated information. A frame is considered to be a stable 
psychological device that negotiates perceptions in order to offer certain perspective: it 
manipulates salience of particular elements to influence subsequent interpretation, 
judgment or behavior.  
But mental spaces are different from ‘scripts’ and ‘frames’ in that they are not 
stable tools, ready to be applied to an initially confusing set of perceptions. They are not 
“…data structures resident in long-term memory and ready to use when needed” but are, 
rather, “constructed during comprehension tasks as well as during abstract and creative 
thought.”174 What is wrong, however, with understanding the framing problem through 
the prism of Goffmanian scripts?  
“There is an all too common vision of this distinction that we must vigorously 
oppose here: the idea that long-term memory is a storehouse of sentence-like things 
(propositions expressed in the “language of thought”) that can be retrieved and 
moved (or copied) to a special place, working memory… […] First of all… the 
individuation of content into isolated beliefs (billions of them!) in as artifact of our 
need, in exposition, to draw attention to focal aspects of the information in long-term 
memory and should not be taken to imply a GOFAI processing model. More 
important, in this context, is the mistaken image of working memory as the place 
where things are sent. The antidote to this vision is to remind yourself that we are 
developing a spreading activation model: working memory is simply that distributed 
portion of the vast neural network that is currently working, awakened, not 
dormant”175 
The problem is, then, that scripts are stable and, generally speaking, not 
                                                
174 Hurley, Dennett, and Adams, Inside Jokes, 97. 
175 Ibid., 107. 
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underspecified, whereas mental spaces are built on the go. A ‘restaurant’ script contains 
all variations of the table arrangement and customer-waiter interactions, and includes the 
placement of the forks; a mental space begins by a low-level activation of the general 
restaurant-related content (such as, perhaps, the presence of stuff and places to sit) that is, 
as one progresses into the dinner date, gradually specified. Each new activation breeds 
another one, thus the restaurant space will spread to specification differently from the 
most general activation ‘anchor’ when in MacDonald’s and differently at L’espalier 
(which is, according to Zagat, the fanciest place in Boston). The fact that mental spaces 
are build incrementally is supported by the evidence from the studies of garden-path 
sentences The studies of linguistic processing, especially the analysis of the ways we 
generate the meaning of garden-path sentences,176 suggests that a mental space is built 
predictively (as the stable script theory would suggest) but also incrementally—and this 
is something that cannot be explained by the framework involving stable semantic 
templates such as frames or scripts. And if we assume that the progress in mental space 
construction happens because activation is spread through the physiological channels of 
neuronal connections, not because the next fitting beliefs or interpretations are logically 
inferred, this model suddenly becomes a great explanatory device for understanding the 
ways of our thought. For it always goes in directions that are hard to predict, and yet, 
when we retrace it, it never seems entirely random. Hurley et al. quote George Santyana 
                                                
176 Kamide, Scheepers, and Altmann, “Integration of Syntactic and Semantic Information in 
Predictive Processing”; Kamide, Altmann, and Haywood, “The Time-course of Prediction in 
Incremental Sentence Processing.” 
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to give a metaphorical flesh to the JIT spreading of activation: 
“Perceptions do not remain in the mind, as would be suggested by the trite simile of 
the seal and the wax […] No, perceptions fall into the brain rather as seeds into a 
furrowed field or even as sparks into a keg of gunpowder. Each image breeds a 
hundred more, sometimes slowly and subterraneously, sometimes (as when a 
passionate train is started) with a sudden burst of fancy.”177 
How many mental spaces are there? A simple mind, such as a lower animal’s 
mind, probably generates only one mental space, the one that pertains to the processing of 
the environmental stimuli here and now—and, in such case, the very concept of a mental 
‘space’ becomes irrelevant. But we are endowed with the capacity to generate multiple 
mental spaces. The authors say, “When you hear Hamlet tell Ophelia, “Get thee to a 
nunnery,” you can put this into a mental space that you created to contain that story and 
thereby avoid coming to believe that Hamlet was telling you where to go.”178 Studies 
seem to indicate that only one mental space can be fully activated at a time, but that 
“…we may quickly, and with little effort, slip back and forth between them.”179  
Now, in congruence with the multiple drafts model, the entirety of the information 
in the activated mental space does not have to be ‘conscious’: if, as the quote above 
explained, we ditch the obsolete distinction between long-term memory and working 
memory, we can speak simply of the levels of activation of particular brain structures. A 
solid anchor of the mental space I am generating for the current moment is the fact that I 
                                                
177 Hurley, Dennett, and Adams, Inside Jokes, 97. 
178 Ibid., 98. 
179 Ibid., 97. 
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am engaged in the process of writing—and that usually involves me sitting on some sort 
of chair. Up until this moment, however, I was not aware of the chair underneath me. It 
was not a part of my conscious experience, and it would remain in the unconscious if I 
did not start looking for an example to mention in the text I am writing. And yet, if the 
out-of-my-awareness chair has suddenly disappeared (and I would fall), or was 
unbeknownst to me quietly replaced with a dragon covered in gold scales (and the sudden 
sensation of movement under my buttocks forced me to look down), I would be surprised 
(to say the least). The fact that such feeling of surprise would occur, claim the authors, 
could mean that the ‘belief’ that the chair is supporting my body has been this entire time 
activated to some, even if low, degree. And since the development of a mental space is 
both, incremental and eager, a surprise, or shock might occur at a realization that the all-
too-keen process went ahead of itself, and activated a belief that is not confirmed later.  
Why does it make sense to adopt the JITSA model? Apart from its unparalleled 
ability to offer an explanation continuous from the physiological aspect to the 
phenomenology of thinking, it seems, much like the initial modular view, to elucidate 
some otherwise puzzling things. The baffling problem of ‘akratic believers’, people who 
seem to have gathered sufficient evidence to reject some claim and yet still hold on to it. 
According to Hurley, Dennett and Adams, two contradictory beliefs held in the same 
time in the long-term memory posit no computational problems for a mind that does not 
activate them simultaneously. It is even easier, as it is the case with akratic believers, to 
entertain the disposition to think that x and a disposition to think that y, where y, by all 
the rules of common sense, implies ~x.  I can, therefore, both ‘believe’ (in terms of an 
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activational disposition) that my partner is faithful, and also ‘believe’ that he has been 
seen naked on top of another, also pretty naked person. How can that happen? First, I 
need not to activate x and y at the same time. But the real problem is not the apparent 
contradiction between the two beliefs, the problem is the lack of habitual associative path 
that would make my brain prone to activate both of them during the construction of the 
same inwardly fractalian activation pattern. If “perceptions fall into the brain as seeds 
into a furrowed field”, then in my particular farming habits certain seeds never produce 
certain kind of sprouts. The authors explain, “We feel epistemic conflict when there is a 
contradiction between active belief elements in working memory—only when they are 
brought into the same working memory space, awakened not transported.”180 
Another encouraging feature of the JITSA model is its evolutionary plausibility. 
Energy conservation is not an evolutionary goal per se,181 but more often than not it is 
precisely what best serves the replicatory objective—and just-in-time processing is the 
most thrifty way of tackling computational tasks. One of the objections that might arise in 
response to this is the problem of anticipation. Evolution must certainly favor foresight: it 
seems fairly self-evident that we are successful at enduring as a species mainly because 
we can anticipate the future quite well. JITSA processing might conserve energy, but, 
since it progresses only on demand, it appears to be a bad anticipatory system. This worry 
is, however, unwarranted. In JITSA we still produce countless predictions about the 
future; the thing is that we are not doing it as the shopping models would suggest, by the 
                                                
180 Ibid., 102. 
181 Nothing is a ‘goal’ in evolution, of course; it is a metaphorical way of speaking.  
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enumeration of all future possibilities followed by the comparison of their likelihood. 
Instead, “The expectations we have at hand each are the result of current situation-
pertinent thought or recollections of other pertinent-at-the-time thoughts each of which 
are the result of JITSA”182 The speed with which we grow activation patters is, from the 
phenomenological point of view, so high, that we are under the illusion of the 
completeness of the emerging frames,183 but in fact the only predictions that we end up 
with are created on the go, through the associative patterns that direct the spreading of the 
activation.  We are lucky in that even though JITSA generates far less predictions that a 
                                                
182 Hurley, Dennett, and Adams, Inside Jokes, 102. 
183 Think about being told that your friend just bought a ticket to Warsaw. At first, all that you 
attend to is the fact that he is going to make a trip, perhaps you are not even making any 
assumptions at all about what kind of ticket he bought. Or maybe you did, but it would be a very 
low-level one, perhaps an assumption that would activate the possibility of a plane ticket (since 
one has to get over the Atlantic to get to Poland). If it does turn out to be a plane ticket, it feels as 
if the frame was strongly present there from the start; the activation of that belief simply occurs 
anew or becomes higher, and nothing in the mental space has to be rearranged. It feels as if we 
have known this from the start. But then, what kind of plane is it? Your mental space can equally 
eagerly accommodate a Boing and an Airbus; neither one disrupts the processing, and fits in, so 
to speak, like a glove into the on-the-go building enterprise. The speed with which the next steps 
of specification can be adopted (provided there is no ‘shock’ involved and our friend did not get a 
ticket for an experimental use of a teleportation device) poses as a prori completeness of what is, 
in fact, an incrementally constructed space.  
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Bayesian model could, it still generally generates predictions that are highly relevant—
but then if it did not, it would be discarded much earlier in our evolutionary history.  
But since activation spreads in the brain not the way it does in a Von Neumann 
machine, but more randomly, and it does so with some eager momentum, we are bound 
to go too far down the wrong activation path once in a while, and assume either too much 
or too little about the situation. We thought someone was confessing their love to us, 
when in fact they were talking about our friend. We thought we know who was the 
murderer before Sherlock Holmes did, and we were wrong. As Europeans, we were 
convinced that food and drinks are served on all flights; apparently not in the US—and 
we end up starving in San Francisco well after midnight. Here is, then, another reason to 
adopt JITSA that comes from evolutionary plausibility. It seems that, as a fallible device, 
it must have been equipped with some sort of debugging mechanism in order to lead 
humans into the brave new world of continuous genetic replication. Hurley, Dennett and 
Adams’ book’s subtitle is Using Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mind, and their thesis is 
that mirth we experience when hearing a good joke is an evolutionary reward for noticing 
a problem with the currently constructed on-the-go mental space.  
Consider, for instance, the following joke by Emo Phillips, cited by the authors: “I 
got into a fight with a very big guy and he said ‘I’m going to mop the floor with your 
face’. I said ‘You’ll be sorry’ and he said ‘Oh yeah? Why?’ I said ‘Well, you won’t be 
able to get into the corners very well.’”184 The claim is that what causes mirth in this and 
similar cases is the fact that up to a certain point (the third line of the joke) our JITSA 
                                                
184 Hurley, Dennett, and Adams, Inside Jokes, 127. 
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processing already led us quite deep into some particular direction (in this case, of fight-
related associations). And yet at the last moment we are shown that the assumptions were 
inaccurate and the constructed activation pattern will not be able to accommodate the 
subsequent stimulus—the response is not confrontational, but both a little cowardly and 
unexpectedly kind. Mirth is a cleverly constructed reaction that rewards most cases of 
realization that our current mental space with all its future possibilities of further nested 
and consistent activation has turned to be badly designed from the start. 185  The 
amusement, it seems, increases in degree proportionally to how covert a particular 
directional assumption has been.  
Hence, the JITSA model is worthy of consideration, for reasons connected to its 
empirical adequacy (as indicated by the studies on linguistic processing), evolutionary 
plausibility (energy conservation and general relevance of on-the-go predictions) 
modeling structure (a seamless continuum from the neurological level to the 
phenomenological perspective) and its explanatory power (we can finally understand, for 
instance, why it is so easy to hold contradictory beliefs or what makes a surprise; we can 
                                                
185 This is no place for a fuller exposition of this particular theory of humor, but the authors make 
a convincing case, showing how the ‘debugging’ of the not-always-reliable JITSA processing can 
explain cases from first-person humor, when we realize that the glasses we were looking for are 
actually right there on our nose) through tickling, comedy, absurd humor to the ever-amusing (for 
infants, that is) peek-a-boo game. There are, of course, cases where such realization is more of a 
shock than an occasion for joy (someone friendly turns out to be a murderer, for instance), but 
formally the mechanism such discovery is always pleasant.  
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begin to understand humor and its advantages and the reason why crime stories are such a 
pleasant thrill—provided they are not happening to us in real life, of course).  
We might be, after all, creatures made of modules that are held together by a 
homeostatic mechanism, who process their data in a disorganized ways and have little 
access to the causal mechanisms behind out thoughts and behavior. Perhaps we run after 
birds rather than organize shelves, and perhaps all feelings of agency are, in one way or 
another, a simple habit of attribution.  
3.  Conclus ion 
I have begun this thesis by pointing to a metaphorical structure that has been governing 
our thinking of action. I argued that this structure can be best explained as an image of a 
computing machine with linear processing, and that even though hardly ever overtly 
endorsed, it remained in philosophy of action as a system that governs the tendencies 
(inferential and semantic) of in particular theories. I called those, who retained this 
structural metaphor Tortoises, and argued against a number of their strategies. I often 
mentioned Dewey as a contrast to this way of thinking, as an ultimate Hare, and I 
expressed a longing for a theory like his, that would tie together the biology and culture, 
and explained our actions without prejudice, in terms of the process, without a proclivity 
to satisfy folk-psychological notions, or normative hopes. And then I presented a couple 
of models of action that promise a similarly comprehensive account, where naturalistic 
input is allowed in the explanation of moral notions, and empirical adequacy is a relevant 
element of the model’s reliability.  
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Let us say, than, that we have successfully thrown out the old shopping model and 
we already have a suitably adequate and detailed model of generating activity. Let us also 
say that this new model does account for the fact that there are multiple bodily processes 
happening in parallel, and these differently-minded submodules are not under the 
command of one mighty module-king, but rather work alongside; their respective 
operational control determined by their mutual relations in the face of particular kinds of 
stimuli—very much like in Breitenberg’s ‘Vehicles’. An agent is perceived, upon this 
hypothetical model, as a system of fairly separate parts, where a significant subset of 
them, in a variety of combinations, can bring about those kinds of activities that we 
usually deem ‘actions’. A large subset of this subset consists of modules of essentially the 
same kind: they are cognitive units of informational processing (described earlier as 
mental spaces), designed in such a way that despite their vast variety and ability of 
instantaneous emergence only one of them can be operational at a time — though they 
can be switched from “on” to “of” with little effort and in no time. And, once again, our 
model has been built with the deep regard for the fact, even though there is a hierarchy of 
modules in terms of their direct ability to influence the final resulting activity, there is no 
one module that can ever claim full control. It could be a model that is openly 
materialistic and conceives of the conglomerate that is a human being as the end-product 
of a convoluted evolutionary history; a result of a fairly stable order emerging from the 
whimsical substratum of chaos. The emergence of behavioral patterns would be viewed 
as a microcosm of the emergence of the biological agent—as the tactics that survive the 
test of homeostatic maintenance in the face of particular stimuli. The model would cease 
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to suggest that the rational mind is the sole, pure agency that can be rescued from within 
the muddy building matter—‘muddiness’ characterizing both, the biological structure and 
the system of strategy-building.  One could, in the light of the material from part II, 
definitely conceive of a model like that.   
The problem is, of course, that a mechanistic model of this sort does not seem to 
be the best tool for further ethical theorizing. Even if, as I have been arguing, it is ‘better’ 
than other models in metaethics,186 than it might not exactly come as a metaethical savior, 
for it seems not to solve any of our normative problems. In fact it seems to do the exact 
opposite by exposing one fairly widespread Tortoise way of justifying normativity—
namely by deriving it from the alleged structure of action—as obsolete. I have discussed 
examples of this strategy in Part I: Korsgaard,187 Velleman,188 and Bratman189 were my 
prime illustrations. Candace Vogler, or Sarah Buss are also proponents of such an 
argument, claiming that understanding practical rationality can only come from 
                                                
186 In this particular thought here, despite my own views, I do not need to specify a specific way 
(in terms of empirical adequacy, relevance, reliability, truthfulness, etc.) in which this model 
might turn out to be ‘better’ — all I want to express is what happens once it is deemed to be more 
suitable by anyone for any of these reasons.  
187 Korsgaard, “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant”; Korsgaard, “Personal Identity 
and the Unity of Agency”; Korsgaard, Self-Constitution. 
188 Velleman, How We Get Along; Velleman, “Practical Reflection.” 
189  Bratman, “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency”; Bratman, “Two 
Problems About Human Agency”; Bratman, “Three Forms of Agential Commitment.” 
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familiarity with what actions ‘really’ are.190 And, since teleological interpretations are in 
general neat, frugal and comforting, the day-to-day minds of all of us are to some extent 
committed to the idea of normativity born out of ‘being human’—and doing things ‘how 
they should be done’. And then, as Dennett would say, another mechanistic, materialistic 
and contingency-emphasizing model comes into the picture and “…spoils the picnic.”191 
Why should we allow it? Metaethics have made it clear on numerous occasions that 
physics is normatively irrelevant192; it can once again designate a persona non grata, this 
time in the form of a model that, despite the relevance of its explanatory level to the 
questions at hand, does not ‘move the (normative) action forward’ (as script writers say 
in Hollywood).  
My arguments for building a new model of the sort described above have indeed 
been strangely lacking a decisive mention of possible substantive advantages for 
normative inquiry. I do, in Part I, consider Dewey’s view on a possibility of a successful 
normative theory—he believes that all responsible guidance must be rooted in knowing 
the one to be led. There were also others I have brought up, with a similar view on the 
                                                
190 Buss, “What Practical Reasoning Must Be If We Act for Our Own Reasons”; “Reasonably 
Vicious — Candace Vogler | Harvard University Press.” 
191 Dennett, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA, 10. 
192 The most striking (and most recent) expression of this concern can be found in Thomas 
Nagel’s latest book (Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist, Neo-Darwinian Conception 
of Nature is Almost Certainly False.) 
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success conditions of any ethics.193 And yet the kind of ‘knowing’ about the mechanics of 
human activity that the purported model can provide does not seem to be a convenient 
steppingstone to normative justifications. Emphasizing the mechanics instead of design, 
and homogeneity of behavior kinds where previously qualitative differences were 
postulated, leads to, some might think, a moral paralysis of sorts. Problems like 
responsibility distribution or questions such as moral improvement seem to be in no way 
aided or relieved by adopting this view. How does, for instance, a more adequate 
understanding of the leg bone structure help a ballet teacher to teach about ways to 
improve the beauty of a pose? 
My response to such complaint is to admit: yes, there is not much we can do 
normatively with a model like this, except to treat it as a constraint for our normative 
fantasies. But such constraints are, I believe, extremely important to have. It is the luck of 
an ethicist that there are no visible bones to break—and the lack of an anatomy-ignorant 
ballet teacher that whatever her operative model of the bone structure, it is probably, in 
the light of her limited range of experience, empirically adequate, since she is not 
inflicting harm on her students. To overstretch the analogy: if human lives were bodies, 
and moral theories were like ballet teachers with actual powers to bend the legs and 
spines of the dancers, there would be quite a lot of severe injuries—unless the anatomy 
was adequately understood and considered. My suggestion for modeling behavior does 
                                                
193 Dewey, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT; Velleman, “Practical Reflection”; Murdoch, 
Existentialists and Mystics. 
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not yield any normative results in itself, but it does put constraints on what kind of moral 
theory is better suited for animals like us.  
How exactly? The following comparisons are examples of suggestions that result 
from adopting the said kind of model.  For instance: a theory that tends to distribute 
moral responsibility for acts between the agent and her social surroundings is, in this 
light, better than one depicting an agent as the sole target of answerability. Thus Kantian 
concern with an agent as the source of both good and evil would give way to a structural 
perspective, where, in a Foucaultian fashion, they emerge from social formations as much 
as from agential commitments. For example, Claudia Card offers such an account of 
oppression: she focuses on how wrongdoing lies not just in openly evil acts, but is 
systematically campaigned for by common neutrality towards oppressive structures 
through which such acts are, in a large part, bred.194 Another way in which adoption of a 
Hare model discriminates between theories pertains to their recommended conscious 
process of decision-making. Velleman’s impromptu imagining of the next move in the 
context of the narrative-bound ‘emotional cadence’—an exercise that is both, creative, 
instinctive and habitual in nature195—beats game-theoretical decision-maker or Audi’s 
deliberator.196  
Yet another way in which such a model can help us decide between frameworks 
                                                
194 Card, The Atrocity Paradigm; Card, Confronting Evils; Card, “Responsibility Ethics, Shared 
Understandings, and Moral Communities.” 
195 Velleman, How We Get Along. 
196 Audi, Practical Reasoning. 
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concerns their perspective on the role of institutions in constructing the moral realm. If 
genuine actions are, on the grounds of the base model, not quite different from 
‘shmactions’ (to use Enoch’s word again), the burden of detecting morally relevant 
‘units’ of behavior fall onto the institutional make-up of a given society or group. There 
is no metaphysics of agency anymore; just like Arthur Danto gutted the essence of art 
from an artwork and placed it in the surrounding institutional system of ‘artworld’,197 a 
Hare could gladly take away Davidson’s ‘hope for a principle’ and exchange it for 
institutional regularities of ‘agencyworld’. Perhaps in place of a theory of action that 
infallibly determines, which activity is an action and which one is not, a set of “markers” 
can be proposed—indicators that a particular activity should be considered as a morally 
relevant unit. Conceivably, such view of action could look something like this. 
Say X is a name of an activity. Of course without metaphysics we immediately 
run into a problem: how is X even told apart from a stream of ongoing ‘doing’? I would 
say that X, as a term, is essentially fuzzy, and much like W.V. O. Quine’s ‘Gavagai’ must 
rely on the corrective tools of uniformization that a linguistic group provides in order to 
sharpen its reference.198 Now, instead of worrying about the independent properties of X, 
                                                
197 Danto, “The Artworld.” 
198 In Quine's behavioristic view on language acquisition, a new language user can never be fully 
certain that she correctly identified a particular term's meaning. If a rabbit runs in front of a 
linguist visiting a pristine tribe, and he hears the word 'Gavagai', he can equally reasonably 
assume that it means 'rabbit', or 'running rabbit', or 'rabbit's time-slice', or 'rabbit at noon'… some 
of these hypotheses will be rejected, as they will not lead to desired results in communications, 
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an action referee must make a decision based on a number of ‘action markers’. They 
could look something like that: 
(a) agent feels / reports feeling in control of X  
(b) agent entertains a justification of doing X that persists 
(c) agent often repeats X 
(d) agent reports / does not seem to have been coerced to do X 
(e) From the point of view of the moral code used by the ‘referee’, the activity is 
either grossly wrong or uncommonly good, and it has originated, causally 
speaking, from the body of an agent in question.  
There could be more of these markers, I believe; neither of them is necessary, and 
no particular subset of them is decisive in terms of a decision. A list of this sort is, quite 
visibly, culturally contingent and can be amended or changed. But these are only clues, 
and they are mostly clues to our language and the institutional make-up of our 
agencyworld—not to the nature of the acts in question.  
Adopting an adequate Hare model might give us a good tool to adjudicate 
between more and less viable moral theories, on the basis of their fit with the 
                                                                                                                                            
but some of them will be functionally equivalent, thus leaving a language user without any tools 
for ultimate de-fuzzying of a term's meaning. But linguistic life goes on unfazed, and I see no 
problem assuming that potential action-units (such as 'slicing cucumbers' or 'making a salad', or 
'poisoning a neighbor with a cucumber salad') are not only identified because of previous 
linguistic and institutional habits, but also are somewhat fuzzy in what they actually mean. The 
moral life goes on unfazed anyway.  (Quine, Word and Object.; Quine, The Roots of Reference.) 
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underdesigned devices that evolution has made us to be. The Hare ethics is ethics without 
a stable ground, where a well-understood creature has to be supplied with suitable goals 
and rules, and the nature of these rules emerges from previous (also linguistic) inquiry, 
creativity of the ‘law-maker’ and continuous testing. The normative component can 
become, as Hume intended, logically divorced from the descriptive one, and yet it is still 
designed for the creature from the description. If Breitenburg’s vehicle is to drive towards 
the good, we have to learn which of its sensors to adjust, and how—but that does not 
mean that we can find the direction of ‘goodness’ engraved on a plaque in its engine. 
Can we do this, are we able to self-understand to the level of biology, and still be 
moral? Or openly non-metaphysical normativity automatically looses its allure, because 
we do, in fact, need to, ‘Repeat old incantations of humanity fables and legends /…/ 
repeat great words repeat them stubbornly”?199 I have no idea, but the good news is that 
we keep graduating from various old fables ever since we wrote them. And if we do 
outgrow this one, our ethics will become more realistic and effective. Reasonable habits, 
bolstered by the institutional context and designed for animals like us, modular, ‘gappy’, 
governed by association rather than inference, can help us live together a little more 
happily. Dewey says of wind, “The same air that under certain conditions ruffles the pool 
or wrecks buildings, under other conditions purifies the blood and [through speech] 
conveys thought.”200 Perhaps the same water that, as Fortinbras suggests, divides us from 
                                                
199 Herbert, The Envoy of Mr. Cogito 
200 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 20 
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each other can, under different conditions, become the medium that connects us—if we 
only accept each other for who we are.  
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